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Mapping Digital Media
Th e values that underpin good journalism, the need of citizens for reliable and abundant information, and 
the importance of such information for a healthy society and a robust democracy: these are perennial, and 
provide compass-bearings for anyone trying to make sense of current changes across the media landscape. 
Th e standards in the profession are in the process of being set. Most of the eﬀ ects on journalism imposed 
by new technology are shaped in the most developed societies, but these changes are equally inﬂ uencing the 
media in less developed societies.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project, which examines the changes in-depth, aims to build bridges between 
researchers and policy-makers, activists, academics and standard-setters across the world. It also builds policy 
capacity in countries where this is less developed, encouraging stakeholders to participate and inﬂ uence 
change. At the same time, this research creates a knowledge base, laying foundations for advocacy work, 
building capacity and enhancing debate. 
Th e Media Program of the Open Society Foundations has seen how changes and continuity aﬀ ect the media in 
diﬀ erent places, redeﬁ ning the way they can operate sustainably while staying true to values of pluralism and 
diversity, transparency and accountability, editorial independence, freedom of expression and information, 
public service, and high professional standards.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project assesses, in the light of these values, the global opportunities and risks 
that are created for media by the following developments:
 the switchover from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting,
 growth of new media platforms as sources of news,
 convergence of traditional broadcasting with telecommunications.
Covering 60 countries, the project examines how these changes aﬀ ect the core democratic service that any 
media system should provide—news about political, economic and social aﬀ airs. 
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Th e aim of the Mapping Digital Media project is to assess the impact of these changes on the core democratic 
service that any media system should provide, namely news about political, economic and social aﬀ airs. 
Th e Mapping Digital Media reports are produced by local researchers and partner organizations in each 
country. Cumulatively, these reports will provide a much-needed resource on the democratic role of digital 
media.
In addition to the country reports, the Open Society Media Program has commissioned research papers on a 
range of topics related to digital media. Th ese papers are published as the MDM Reference Series.
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Mapping Digital Media: Thailand
Executive Summary
Th e dawn of the digital age in Th ailand has coincided with a prolonged political divide and stalemate that 
has had a profound impact on how the technology has been embraced. In some respects political division has 
gravely undermined the opportunities, yet it has helped usher in the most promising development in Th ai 
media for more than a generation: an independent public service broadcaster.
In more than a decade since this country of now nearly 70 million began its recovery from the 1997 ﬁ nancial 
crisis, political power has oscillated between Th aksin Shinawatra and his allies on the one hand, and his 
various opponents—including the military—on the other. 
Th ese divisions have manifested themselves in the media environment. For instance, not until December 
2010 did Th ailand ﬁ nally pass a law to establish a converged telecoms and broadcast regulator. Th is followed 
10 years during which attempts to set one up were blocked by vested political and commercial interests. Th us, 
there has been no plan for the digitization of terrestrial television or orderly spectrum allocation. Th ailand 
still doesn’t have a full roll-out of 3G services.
When the regulator’s 11 members are independently appointed by mid-2011, they will ﬁ nd all these issues 
on their agenda. However, the fact that the law provides for public hearings and legal challenges to their 
decisions means the whole process could be plunged back into political-legal deadlock.
Th e regulator’s behaviour will need to be closely monitored; for Th ailand’s raft of content-regulating laws 
could easily have a chilling eﬀ ect if they are applied harshly to online platforms. 
Free-to-air TV is the most important source of news and entertainment but is rapidly being challenged 
by satellite and cable, which promise to overtake terrestrial television in the near future. Th is is partly as a 
result of the passage of the Broadcasting Business Act of 2008, which allows cable and satellite TV to carry 
advertising. At the same time, the Act’s automatic licensing regime led to a proliferation of broadcasters, the 
biggest of them the inﬂ ammatory mouthpieces of the factions that dominate Th ailand’s divisive politics. 
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Newspaper readership, meanwhile, has been declining at rates similar to those in other parts of the world. 
Apart from the introduction of some multimedia content and website innovations, together with Twitter and 
Facebook feeds, the mainstream print media have mostly been playing a slow catch-up game. One notable 
exception is the Manager group, whose diverse outlets mostly echo the political voice of Mr Th aksin’s arch-
rival, Sondhi Limthongkul.
Young, urban Th ais are proliﬁ c on-line networkers, but they are few relative to the total population (about 6 
per cent). It is another sign of the times that among the top ten Th ai keywords in Twitter in 2010, six were 
associated with politics.
In the midst of this cacophony is the calm voice of Th ai Public Broadcasting Service (Th ai PBS), built in 
2008 from the remnants of a channel bitterly contested by Mr Th aksin and his adversaries. All the evidence 
suggests that Th ai PBS’s television channel, ‘TV-Th ai’, is independent, relatively balanced and professional. 
However, it was born on a battleﬁ eld already swarming with mass entertainment channels on the one side 
and emerging new media on the other. So far, its average audience has reached little more than 0.5 per cent 
of the population and it ranks ﬁ fth out of six terrestrial stations (ahead only of the disrespected government 
mouthpiece).
Th e most negative development in Th ailand’s embrace of digitization has been the willingness of the authorities 
to use the Computer-Related Crime Act of 2007, often combined with the country’s draconian lèse majesté 
laws, in an eﬀ ort to silence its critics. In addition, a State of Emergency—in place for most of 2010—has 
been used to shut down TV and radio stations and newspapers, and to censor the internet. 
Th e excuse most often used by the state for intervening in the media is the claim that they cannot regulate 
themselves. Th is adds urgency to the need for professional media bodies to reinforce self-regulatory 
mechanisms by strengthening their codes of conduct and streamlining complaint processes, in order to meet 
the challenges of the new media landscape. 
If self-regulation proves insuﬃ  cient to meet these challenges, some forms of co-regulation, involving the 
state’s legal power to back up self-regulation, should be considered. Only in the event of legal violations 
should oﬀ enders be prosecuted. Even then, however, there would be no need for the media organization to 
be closed under the Emergency Decree or any other laws. 
As the media are increasingly used as propaganda machines by politicians and politically motivated groups, 
media literacy should be urgently promoted at every level of society. In particular, audiences should be 
encouraged to consume and compare information from diverse sources. Media monitoring activities by 
academic or civil society sectors should also be promoted, to help citizens become more media literate. 
Independent civic groups promoting media literacy should join forces with academic institutions and 
professional bodies to develop media literacy courses in schools and universities.
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Context
Th ailand has a relatively homogeneous population. More than 85 percent speak the Th ai language and 
share a common culture. About 14 percent are of Chinese descent, but the Sino-Th ai community is the 
best integrated in Southeast Asia. Malay-speaking Muslims in some southern provinces comprise another 
signiﬁ cant minority group. Th eir integration into Th ai society has been far from smooth, as is evident from 
ongoing violence in the ‘Deep South’ over the past decade. Other minorities include mountain-dwelling 
tribes, such as the Hmong and the Karen. Many of them do not have citizenship and have had diﬃ  culties 
integrating into Th ai society. 
Th e population is mostly rural, concentrated in the rice-growing areas of the central, northeastern, and 
northern regions. However, as the country continues to industrialize, its urban population is expanding 
quickly. 
With an income per capita of US$4,400 in 2010, the country is classiﬁ ed by the World Bank as a lower 
middle-income country. Due to its relatively high economic growth rate over the past two decades or more, 
unemployment has stabilized at 1 to 2 percent. Th ere are even labor shortages in many sectors, resulting 
in an inﬂ ow of over two million migrant workers from the neighboring countries of Myanmar, Laos, and 
Cambodia.
While the country has enjoyed economic growth, the income gap between urban and rural population 
continues to widen and has become a serious social and political problem. A recent study shows that the 
political conﬂ icts over the past few years, in particular the violent clashes in 2010, are partly associated with 
the income and regional divide. Th e study found that Bangkok residents and higher-income people in the 
provinces tended to favor the so-called ‘Yellow Shirts’ (those opposed to former prime minister Th aksin 
Shinawatra’s abuse of power, led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy), while supporters of the ‘Red Shirts’ 
(those opposing the ‘aristocratic polity’, led by the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship) were 
found to be more heterogeneous.2 
2. Ammar Siamwalla and Somchai Jitsuchon, “Th e Socio-economic bases of the Red-Yellow Divide: A Statistical Analysis”, 2010, available at 
http://www.tdri.or.th/en/pdf/d2010013.pdf (accessed 20 November 2010).
9O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 1
Social Indicators
Population: 66.9 million
Number of households: 19.5 million (2009)
Figure 1. 
Rural–urban breakdown (% of total population)
Source: National Statistical Oﬃ  ce.
Figure 2.
Ethnic composition (% of total population)
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Figure 3. 
Religious composition (% of total population)
Source: CIA World Fact Book, 2011.
Table 1.
Economic indicators for Th ailand
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011f 2012f
GDP (current prices), 
total in US$ billion
176.35 207.22 247.11 272.49 263.97 312.60 334.502 356.20
GDP (in US$, current prices) 
per capita
2,708 3,174 3,758 4,107 3,940 4,620 4,888 5,161
Gross National Income (GNI), 
current US$, per capita
6,420 6,970 7,550 7,830 7,640 n/a n/a n/a
Unemployment 
(% of total labor force)
1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 n/a n/a n/a
Inﬂ ation (average annual rate 
in % against previous year, 
consumer prices)
4.5 4.7 2.3 5.5 -0.9 3.0 2.7 2.5
Note: n/a: not available.
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1. Media Consumption: 
 the Digital Factor 
1.1 Digital take-up
1.1.1 Digital equipment and literacy
Th ere is widespread concern among policymakers that the technical infrastructure, regulatory framework and 
media literacy of the Th ai people are not adequate for the digital age. While the penetration rates of television 
sets and mobile phones are quite high, reaching over 95 and 80 percent of households respectively, take-up 
of other digital technologies, especially personal computers, is still very low (see Table 2). Th ere are also 
concerns over the “digital divide” between urban and rural areas. Most notably, the penetration of personal 
computers in urban households is 2.5 times greater than that in rural areas. 
Table 2.
Households owning equipment in Th ailand
2007 2008 2009
HH (million)3 % of THH4 HH (million) % of THH HH (million) % of THH
TV set 17.7 96.3 18.6 97.2 19.2 97.4
Radio set 11.6 63.9 11.4 60.3 n/a n/a
PC 3.18 17.5 3.58 19.6 3.87 20.3
Note: n/a: not available.
Source: Data for TV are from AGB Nielsen Media Research and data for radio and PC are from the National Statistical Oﬃ  ce 
(NSO).
3. Total number of households owning the equipment. 
4. Percentage of total number of households in the country.
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1.1.2 Platforms
Th ailand’s weakness is most evident in the areas of modern digital technologies. In particular, the roll-out 
of 3G mobile phone and WiMAX services has long been delayed, conﬁ rming a low overall rate of adoption 
of wireless broadband technology in particular and broadband technology in general (see Table 4). In 
addition, the plan for digitization of terrestrial television has not been formulated due to a regulatory gridlock 
(see section 5).
Table 3. 
Platform for the main TV reception and digital take-up5

















Terrestrial reception 13.5 74.4 12.9 68.3 12.8 66.1 11.8 56.3
 of which digital
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cable and satellite reception 4.2 21.9 5.7 28.9 6.4 31.3 9.2 43.7
 of which digital
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Internet Protocol TV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 17.7 96.3 18.6 97.2 19.2 97.4 21.0 100.0
 of which digital
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Note: * Forecast by Satellite Television Association (Th ailand).
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research. 
Table 4. 
Internet subscriptions as % of total population and mobile phone subscriptions as % of total population
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Internet 12.0 14.2 15.5 18.2 20.1
 of which broadband n/a 52.8 58.0 48.7 55.8
Mobile telephony 36.7 41.6 47.3 52.8 56.8
 of which 3G 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Estimates based on National Statistical Oﬃ  ce (NSO) survey data. 
5. Th e ﬁ gures refer to the main TV set in the households for multi-TV households.
6. Total number of households owning the equipment.
7. Percentage of total number of TV households (TVHH) in the country.
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1.2 Media Preferences
1.2.1 Main Shifts in News Consumption
Terrestrial free-to-air television has long dominated the media landscape. However, there appears to be a 
long-term slow decline in overall terrestrial television ratings (TVR),8 which fell from 12.3 percent in the 
ﬁ rst quarter of 2006 to 11.1 percent in the ﬁ rst quarter of 2010 (Figure 4). While the audience share of each 
television station has changed over time, the ranking has remained fairly stable. As can be seen from Table 8, 
Channel 7 and Channel 3, the two leading entertainment channels, are the clear winners in term of audience 
share, far ahead of Channel 5, Channel 9, Th ai PBS (public television), and NBT (state television).
Figure 4. 
Trends in overall terrestrial TV ratings (TVR) 
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research.
Th e changes in consumption of radio news have been more pronounced (Figure 5). Although the overall 
listenership9 in Bangkok has not changed much, there was a 22 percent fall in the audience for radio stations 
specializing in news between 2007 (1,017,007) and 2009 (796,009).
 
8. Th e TVR of a program is the percentage of television households that viewed the program at the time speciﬁ ed. Th e TVR of a channel is similarly 
deﬁ ned. 



























  Total TVR
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Figure 5. 
Radio listenership in Bangkok, 2007–2009
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research.
Overall newspaper readership also declined signiﬁ cantly from 26.3 million in 2007 to 18.9 million in 2009, 
equivalent to a 14 percent drop year on year (Figure 6).
Figure 6. 
Newspaper readership in Th ailand, 2007–2009
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research.
Th ere are two possible explanations for the reduction in newspaper readership. Th e ﬁ rst is that some groups 
of people, e.g. the young, may consume less news from any sources. Th e second is they do not consume 
less news but shift their consumption to new media. While lack of data makes it impossible to distinguish 
between the two explanations, the second explanation appears more likely. 
As the digitization of terrestrial television has not started in Th ailand, our analysis will be limited to three 
technologies: cable television, satellite television and the internet. While the consumption of radio and 
newspaper has seen a signiﬁ cant decline, the consumption of satellite and cable television has grown by leaps 
and bounds over the past ﬁ ve years. Table 5 shows that households with satellite dishes or cable television 
are quickly approaching the number of households with terrestrial television aerials. Th is suggests that cable 
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Table 5. 
Household ownership of satellite dishes, cable and terrestrial aerials 
(expressed in % of all TV households in the country)





Note: *Forecast by Satellite Television Association (Th ailand). 
Source: Calculated by the authors using data from AGB Nielsen Media Research. 
Research in 2009 by AGB Nielsen shows that ratings and share of terrestrial and cable television are now 
very close (Table 5). In fact, the share of cable television viewers is already larger than that of terrestrial 
television during most non-prime time periods and even some prime times (see Table 7). All statistics indicate 
that the rise of satellite and cable has caused audiences to migrate from terrestrial television. As a result, 
the oligopolistic structure of the television market, long dominated by terrestrial television, appears to be 
eroding fast.
Table 6. 
TVR and audience share of terrestrial television and cable television
TV platform 2010 January 2010
Share TVR
Terrestrial TV 50.86 5.95
Cable TV 49.14 5.76
Total 100.00 11.71
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research, cited in Positioning magazine, no. 70, March 2010. 
Table 7. 
Comparison of TVR of cable and terrestrial television
Time periods when cable TV has 
more audience than terrestrial TV
Time periods when cable TV has 
less audience than terrestrial TV
Time TVR of cable TV Time TVR of cable TV
11p.m.–1p.m. 4–14 % 5 p.m.–7p.m. 10–16 %
2p.m.–5p.m. 10–14 % 9p.m.–11p.m. 15–21 %
7p.m.–9p.m. 12–18 %
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research, cited in Positioning magazine, no. 70, March 2010. 
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In addition to the growth of cable and satellite televisions, the internet appears to be becoming a platform 
for occasional news consumption. Lack of reliable research, however, makes it impossible to support this 
impression with clear evidence. An online survey by the National Electronics and Computer Technology 
Center (NECTEC) reported that 85.5 percent of the online sample have consumed online news, deﬁ ned as 
news consumption by electronic devices.10 According to this survey, which provides the only research on this 
topic, online sources are seen by many internet users as complementing mainstream media, from which they 
diﬀ er in speed and trustworthiness. While 44.8 percent of those surveyed responded that consumption of 
online news did not bring about any changes in their consumption of news from newspapers, 28.6 percent 
said that consuming online news made them read newspapers less often. Concerning trustworthiness, 
however, 48.4 percent of respondents believed that television was the most trustworthy news source, followed 
by newspapers (22.7 percent) and the internet (19.2 percent). 
1.2.2 Availability of a Diverse Range of News Sources
Th e passage of the Broadcasting Business Act of 2008 has spurred the growth of cable and satellite television in 
two ways. First, the Act classiﬁ es cable and satellite television as services under an automatic licensing regime: 
all qualiﬁ ed applicants are granted licenses to operate. Second, it allows cable and satellite television to carry 
advertising for the ﬁ rst time, thus lifting the ban on advertising in existing cable and satellite concessions.11 
Th is allows for the emergence of new business models based on advertising. Technological development has 
also lowered the investment cost and promotes entry into the market. According to Positioning magazine, 
it now costs only THB 30 million (US$950,000) to buy equipment and set up a new satellite television 
studio.12 An additional monthly expenditure of only THB 3 million (US$95,000) is needed for personnel 
and satellite link costs. 
Th ese changes have encouraged dozens of content providers and media companies to set up new cable and 
satellite television stations. Th e television landscape, traditionally dominated by a few companies, suddenly 
became crowded as many operators, including the Nation Channel, INN, Post TV, MCOT, ASTV, PTV, 
and Voice TV, rushed to enter the market. Some of them, such as the Nation Channel, INN, Post TV, and 
MCOT, are existing mainstream news providers that went into satellite and cable broadcasting mainly for 
business reasons. Others, such as ASTV, PTV, and Voice TV were established for political, not commercial, 
reasons. As a result, their representation of facts and viewpoints is highly biased, to the extent that they 
are widely viewed as ‘propaganda machines’ or ‘mouthpieces’ of certain political groups. Examples of such 
bias oversimplify complicated issues by providing one-sided information, if not misinformation, inserting 
viewpoints into news content, attacking political rivals by digging into their personal lives, and using political 
rhetoric to incite hatred against them. 
10. NECTEC, Internet User Proﬁ le of Th ailand 2009, accessed online from http://pld.nectec.or.th/websrii/images/stories/documents/books/inter-
netuser_2009.pdf, March 2010.
11. For the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve years following the adoption of the law, cable and satellite television channels will be allowed to air advertising for up to six 
minutes per hour. After that, the regulator will review whether the cap should be increased to 10 minutes per hour, the same as the terrestrial 
television channels. Th is transitional provision is the result of a compromise between the two groups of broadcasters.
12. S. Manchainimit, “Th e Age of Satellite TV”, in Positioning magazine (no. 70), March 2010.
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In sum, the arrival of satellite, cable and internet outlets has increased the range of choice for news consumers. 
However, it raises an uneasy question as to whether such lop-sided news reporting organizations should be 
treated as media or as propaganda instruments. 
As in other countries, media organizations, civil society groups, and individuals have made active use of 
the internet for disseminating news. Some major media organizations, including the Manager Group and 
Matichon, even set up separate editorial teams for traditional and online content. Th e online version of Th e 
Nation newspaper goes another step by oﬀ ering blogs for its readers to express their opinions. Th e Nation also 
requires all its journalists to create Facebook and Twitter accounts and use them as reporting platforms (see 
section 4.1). Th e Bangkok Post has been a slower starter. Its website is still run separately from the newspaper, 
with only ‘breaking news’ being assembled by a small team from internet sources, with no original reporting 
done. Th e newspaper content is then uploaded overnight. A Multimedia Editor was appointed in late 2010 
as part of some tentative steps aimed at adapting to the digital age. 
As for less institutionalized media, Prachatai stood out as one of the most active websites for alternative 
news sources and citizen journalism, until it was shut down by the government during the political 
conﬂ ict in early 2010. Many of its articles were written by professional journalists, scholars, and social 
activists. Other alternative online news sources include Prachatam.com, Midnightuniv.org, Onopen.com, 
Openthaidemocracy.com, and Sameskybooks.org, to name but a few. 
Social networking sites have recently entered the news landscape. Th e number of Facebook and active Twitter 
users reached 2.8 million13 and 80,000 respectively in early 2010.14 Suthichai Yoon, editor-in-chief of Th e 
Nation and Th ailand’s top-ranking tweeter, said that Twitter is an eﬃ  cient way of tapping into the “wisdom 
of crowds”. According to statistics from Th ailand Trending in March 2010,15 Twitter is used heavily for 
disseminating and discussing political news. Among the top ten Th ai keywords in Twitter, six were associated 
with political issues in Th ailand. Similarly, four (#welovethai, #redmarch, #redtweet and #ptv) out of the top 
ten hashtags referred to by Th ai Tweeples (Twitter users) were related to politics.16 Many politicians, including 
the prime minister, senior ministers, and opposition leaders, have jumped on the Twitter bandwagon to 
communicate directly with their supporters and the media. Political activities on Facebook are also vibrant, 
as can be seen from the burgeoning number of political campaign pages during the political conﬂ icts of the 
past few years. 
13. Facebakers.com, accessed in March, 2010.
14. Estimated by Lab.in.th/thaitrend, accessed in March 2010.
15. Lab.in.th/thaitrend, accessed in March 2010.
16. Lab.in.th/thaitrend, accessed in March 2010.
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1.3 News Providers
1.3.1 Leading Sources of News
Television
Th ere is no regular survey of the popularity of news sources. Th e only available information is derived from 
Sripatum Poll.17 Th e polls were conducted in Bangkok in 2009 with the survey population of 3,000. Th e 
poll found that television was the most popular source of news (68.0 percent), followed by newspapers (13.6 
percent), the internet (12.1 percent) and radio (3.2 percent).
Table 8. 
Market share of free-to-air television stations (2006–2009)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Thai PBS* 12.6 10.3 7.0 4.9
NBT 3.0 2.4 4.6 3.4
CH9 10.2 9.2 9.7 10.0
CH7 41.2 41.9 44.3 45.6
CH5 7.3 6.7 7.1 8.7
CH3 25.6 29.6 27.3 27.6
Note: * Before 2008, this channel was known as iTV, a commercial station. Th us, comparisons should be made with care. 
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research.
As there are no ratings for news programs on cable and satellite television, our discussion of television is 
limited to news programs on terrestrial television. 
Table 9. 
Five most popular ‘hard’ news programs on terrestrial television18
News Programs Start Time End Time Audience (number of viewers) 2009
8PM NEWS (CH7) 8:06 p.m. 8:26 p.m. 6,849,000
8PM NEWS (CH3) 7:56 p.m. 8:16 p.m. 5,680,000
Praden Ded 7 See (News Talk) (CH7) 10:35 p.m. 11:10 p.m. 3,044,000
Khao 3 Miti (News Talk) (CH3) 10:30 p.m. 11:05 p.m. 2,264,000
Rueng Lao Sao-A-Tid (News Talk) (CH3) 10:59 a.m. 12:18 p.m. 1,898,000
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research (as of September 2009).
17. “Survey of People’s Attitudes to News Consumption”, available at http://research.spu.ac.th/poll/content/1/12362.php.
18. ‘Hard’ news refers here to news related to social, economic and political aﬀ airs in general. It does not necessarily refer to investigative journalism. 
In fact, unlike the press, investigative news in television outlets is still not common. 
1 9O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 1
Table 10.
Five most popular ‘tabloid’ news programs on terrestrial television
News Programs Start Time End Time Audiences (number of viewers) 2009
TV Pool (CH5) 8:10 p.m. 8:30 p.m. 1,420,000
Bangkok Gossip (CH3) 10.50 a.m. 11.00 a.m. 1,100,000
Khan Pak (CH7) 7.00 a.m. 8.00 a.m. 843,000
Dao Krajai (CH9) 20.15 p.m. 20.30 p.m. 781,000
9 Entertain (CH9) 11.05 a.m. 11.45 a.m. 300,000
Source: Estimated from ratings data compiled by AGB Nielsen Media Research. 
Radio
Whereas television stations broadcast a variety of programs, most radio stations, especially those in the 
Bangkok metropolitan area, are specialist stations. Based on the way the listenership survey is conducted, 
there are currently no data for each radio program. Only aggregated data for the stations in Bangkok are 
available. As a result, it is possible to identify the most popular news stations but not the most popular news 
programs. Tables 12 and 13 show the ﬁ ve most popular stations that specialize in hard and tabloid news.19 
Table 11.
Radio listenership of news stations in Bangkok by monthly regular listeners (2007–2009)
Frequency Station 2007 2008 2009
FM 99.0 Muang Thai Kang Rang 262,000 248,000 205,000
FM 96.5 Kluen Kwam Kid 151,000 112,000 149,000
FM 106.0 Family News 100,000 126,000 124,000
FM 90.5 Nation Radio 92,000 63,000 71,000
FM 105.0 Wisdom Radio 74,000 62,000 67,000
FM 100.5 News Station 24 Hr 110,000 62,000 40,000
FM 101.5 Chulalongkorn Radio 69,000 49,000 59,000
FM 99.5 Ruam Duay Chuay Kun 88,000 38,000 48,000
FM 101.0 INN 69,000 45,000 31,000
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research.
19. As very few stations air only tabloid news programs, music stations that broadcast a high proportion of tabloid news content are also classiﬁ ed 
as ‘tabloid stations’.
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Table 12.
Five most popular ‘hard’ news radio stations
Frequency Station Average number of listeners
2007 2008 2009
FM 99.0 MCOT Muang Thai Kang Rang 262,000 248,000 205,000
FM 96.5 MCOT Kluen Kwam Kid 151,000 112,000 149,000
FM 106.0 Family News 100,000 126,000 124,000
FM 90.5 The Nation 92,000 63,000 71,000
FM 105.0 Wisdom Radio 74,000 62,000 67,000
Source: Estimated from ratings data compiled by AGB Nielsen Media Research.
Table 13.
Five most popular ‘tabloid’ news radio stations
Frequency Station Average number of listeners
2007 2008 2009
FM 95.0 Look Tung Maha Nakorn 1,425,000 1,248,000 1,136,000
FM 97.5 Seed FM 940,000 653,000 550,000
FM 93.0 Cool FM 599,000 425,000 530,000
FM 103.5 FM One 397,000 377,000 292,000
FM 94.0 94EFM 188,000 149,000 137,000
Source: Estimated from ratings data compiled by AGB Nielsen Media Research.
News Websites
Among online media, the most popular news sources are websites or web portals. However, most of them 
oﬀ er gossip news and are thus categorized as tabloid media. Th e ﬁ ve most popular non-tabloid and tabloid 
news websites are shown in the two tables below. Th e data is based on Truehits.net, the most popular source 
of web statistics in Th ailand, operated by the Internet Innovation Research Center.
Table 14.
Five most popular non-tabloid news portals (as of 28 March 2010)
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Table 15.
Five most popular tabloid news portals (as of 28 March 2010)








Finally, as mentioned above, newspaper readership has declined—by no less than 14 percent year on year 
between 2007 and 2009.
Table 16.
Newspaper readership (2007–2009)
Newspaper 2007 2008 2009
Thai Rath 12,669,000 12,526,000 9,759,000
Daily News 7,073,000 6,910,000 5,303,000
Khao Sod 1,157,000 960,000 747,000
Ma-Ti Chon 998,000 955,000 717,000
Krungthep Turakij 179,000 95,000 90,000
Post Today 84,000 81,000 85,000
Bangkok Post 71,000 115,000 70,000
The Nation 55,000 33,000 29,000
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research.
1.3.2 Television News Programs
Th e most popular news programs are CH7 8PM News and CH3 8PM News. Both programs present news 
related to activities of the Royal family, followed by entertainment news, news portraying lives of ordinary 
people, and miscellaneous news. 
Table 17 shows that TVRs for both programs have not changed signiﬁ cantly during the past three years. It 
can be argued that the popularity of television as a news source has not been aﬀ ected much by digital media. 
However, as noted in section 1.2, many people now watch terrestrial television news via cable and satellite, 
rather than via terrestrial receivers. 
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Table 17. 
TVRs of the two most popular television news programs (percent)
News Programs 2007 2008 2009
CH7 8PM NEWS 11.4 11.5 11.3
CH3 8PM NEWS 8.0 6.1 7.6
Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research.
1.3.3 Impact of Digital Media on Good-Quality News
Cable, satellite and internet media have increased the diversity of news sources. However, if quality is judged 
by the basic principles of journalism, such as thoroughness, accuracy, impartiality, transparency, freedom from 
bias, and respect for privacy, the contribution of new media to news quality becomes doubtful. A number 
of news channels in cable and satellite television stations such as ASTV, PTV, and Voice TV, are highly 
partisan and clearly politically motivated. Th ey sometimes perform ‘investigative’ reporting by exposing the 
‘wrongdoings’ of their political opponents. During the intense political conﬂ icts of 2009 and 2010, however, 
these channels tended to deepen the divide as many people chose to consume only news consistent with their 
political beliefs, without questioning its reliability. In other words, the ‘Yellow Shirts’ tended to watch ASTV 
and its sister website while the ‘Red Shirts’ ﬂ ocked to PTV and Voice TV. As a result, the two groups of 
audience believed (and appear still to believe) in diﬀ erent versions of the ‘truth’, making peaceful resolution 
of the divide less achievable. Most new media organizations also produce low-budget news content such as 
news talk rather than investing in original news reporting. 
Most mainstream media have news websites. However, they are mainly used for updating news or presenting 
secondhand content. According to AGB Nielsen Media, the advertising spend on the internet is still less 
than 1 percent of the national total. Media organizations are thus understandably reluctant to produce high 
quality content speciﬁ cally for online media. 
1.4 Assessments
Th e Internet User Proﬁ le of Th ailand 2009 reveals that the most important reasons for people to consume 
online news is convenience (56.5%), followed by freedom to choose (18.3%), the capability to participate in 
discussion (13.2%) and low cost (9.8%). Many kinds of beneﬁ t from consuming online news are also cited 
by those surveyed: variety of information (42.6%), freedom of expression (26.7%), increased participation 
(21.4%), immediacy (4.9%), and ease of searching for foreign news (3.3%). In short, choices, interactivity, 
and speed seem to be the main attractions of online new media. On the contrary, accuracy, objectivity, and 
impartiality, the key principles of good journalism, are not mentioned as reasons to consume online news. 
Lower barriers to entry have attracted new participants to the cable and satellite market. As discussed in 
Section 1.2.1, the diversity of news sources has increased signiﬁ cantly as a result of the entrance of ASTV, 
PTV, Voice TV, and the Nation Channel. However, the political viewpoints of some new entrants, especially 
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ASTV, PTV, and Voice TV, reﬂ ect mainly those of their sponsors. As will be discussed later, diversity of 
news sources alone would not produce a healthy journalistic outcome without an eﬀ ort to raise professional 
standards and media literacy among the public. Specialist channels for niche markets such as Farm Channel, 
CSR TV, Look Tung Channel (Th ai folk music), and Miracle TV (astrology and the paranormal) have also 
started to emerge. However, there are still many voices left under-represented in the media, most notably 
minority groups and migrant workers. 
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2. Digital Media and Public or 
 State-Administered Broadcasters
2.1 Public Service and State Institutions
2.1.1 Overview of Public Service Media; Output of News and Current Affairs Output
Before the Th ai Public Broadcasting Service Act (2008), there were only state media and commercially run 
broadcasters. Th e Act set up the Th ai Public Broadcasting Service (Th ai PBS) as the ﬁ rst and so far the only 
truly public broadcaster in Southeast Asia. As a latecomer, Th ai PBS faces a diﬀ erent set of challenges from 
public broadcasters in other parts of the world, which had decades to build up their audience base and 
institutional strength before the new media appeared. As such, its experience may provide valuable lessons 
for public broadcasters in other developing countries.
Although Th ai PBS produces content for television, radio, and website, it is best known for its ﬂ agship 
television service, called “TV Th ai”. Th ai PBS’s ﬁ nancial independence is ensured by an earmarked tax of 1.5 
percent on tobacco and alcohol sales, known as the “sin tax”, with a ceiling of THB 2 billion per year. 
In 2009, Th ai PBS produced around 2,980 hours of news and current aﬀ airs, or 41.9 percent of its total 
airtime of 7,117.5 hours. Th e ratio of news and current aﬀ airs was reduced from 46 percent in 2008 to meet 
its target ratio of 40 percent of news and current aﬀ airs, 30 percent of factual and documentary programs 
and 30 percent of arts and entertainment programs. Th e average audience size in 2009 was 316,169 viewers, 
or a little more than about 0.5 percent of the total population. In terms of popularity, Th ai PBS ranks ﬁ fth 
among six terrestrial television stations. Its website (www.thaipbs.or.th) averages 59,772 unique IP visits per 
month, and monthly page views of 351,391, ranking 35th out of 377 media websites in Th ailand. Among its 
website viewers, 63 percent are repeat visitors.20 
20. Internet statistics provided by Th ai PBS’s Department of Radio and Multimedia.
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2.1.2 Digitization and Services 
Th ere is still no oﬃ  cial timeframe for digital switchover of terrestrial television. Th is is due to the delay in 
establishing the sector regulator, the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), over nearly a decade. Th is 
was due to two court cases ﬁ led by candidates who failed to be selected as NBC commissioners, claiming 
conﬂ icts of interests and procedural irregularities in the selection process. Meanwhile, constitutional changes 
mean that the NBC will have to merge with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), the 
telecom regulator, to form a converged regulator called the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications 
Commission (NBTC). A bill to establish the NBTC, formally named the Frequency Organization Act 
(hereafter referred to as the NBTC Bill or Act), was adopted by parliament and subsequently became eﬀ ective 
on 20 December 2010. Th e NBTC is mandated to draft a master plan for digital switchover within a year of 
its appointment.
In April 2007, representatives from six terrestrial television stations met informally to decide a tentative deadline 
for analog switch-oﬀ . Th ey agreed on 2015, as recommended by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU). Meanwhile, these stations have already invested in digital production and transmission technologies 
and are ready to broadcast in digital within one year of obtaining spectrum. According to the NECTEC 
study on digital terrestrial switchover and information from the Th ai PBS engineering department, Th ai PBS 
appears to be the best prepared of all terrestrial stations for digital broadcasting in terms of technological 
readiness and signal coverage. Th e station’s advantages are due to the fact that it is the only station which 
broadcasts solely in the ultra high frequency (UHF) band.21 
On the demand side, there is no estimate of the number of households that would buy new television sets 
with built-in digital tuners or set-top boxes after digital broadcasting starts. Th e rate of digital take-up will 
depend on the price of a set-top box or a digital television receiver, as well as government policy to subsidize 
them. (See section 7.1.) 
2.1.3 Government Support 
A transitional clause in the NBTC Bill stipulates that if Th ai PBS wants to operate additional television or 
radio services, it will have to apply for new licenses from the NBTC. If such licenses were to be granted, Th ai 
PBS could provide services to speciﬁ c groups of audiences in a way that it currently cannot. For example, 
it can open channels dedicated to education, healthcare, and local government. In addition, it could use 
interactive functions and data services to increase audience engagement, as mentioned in a policy statement 
of its board of governors in March 2010.
2.1.4 Public Service Media and Digital Switch-over 
According to the Th ai PBS engineering department, the station is capable of providing one channel of high 
deﬁ nition television (HDTV) and six channels of standard deﬁ nition television (SDTV) after digitization, if 
21. When iTV (the predecessor of Th ai PBS) was established in 1996, all VHF spectrum was fully occupied by other terrestrial television stations. As 
a result, ITV had to broadcast in the UHF band. When Th ai PBS replaced iTV, it inherited the UHF spectrum and all the related equipment.
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it is allowed to keep the same amount of spectrum.22 Reaching 98 percent of households, Th ai PBS currently 
has the widest coverage of all terrestrial television stations. Its engineers believe this coverage would not be 
signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected by digitization. However, the production budget may not be able to meet the increase 
in transmission capacity, unless its revenue ceiling is adjusted accordingly. 
Th ai PBS currently uses the internet as another platform for distributing television programs. In other 
words, very few of its services or programs are generated speciﬁ cally for the internet. However, the board of 
governors recently issued a policy statement for online media, setting short-term and long-term goals. At the 
initial stage, Th ai PBS will set up online services to provide information on its news and other programs, its 
organization, and other information for foreigners. In the long run, specialized platforms, such as websites for 
children and youth, embedded blogs and online portals for mobile devices, will be created. 
2.2 Public Service Provision
2.2.1 Perception of Public Service Media
Th ai PBS regularly assesses its performance by commissioning outside evaluation teams, selected from reputable 
institutions. Typical methodologies involve focus groups of viewers, non-viewers, media professionals, 
communication scholars, politicians, community leaders, youth representatives, consumer advocates, and 
representatives of underprivileged groups. Th ese informants are independently selected by the evaluation 
team. Results from the 2009 focus groups showed that Th ai PBS was perceived as independent from political 
and commercial interference. It was also recognized as providing public space for citizen dialogue and as 
actively sourcing programs from independent and small producers. An evaluation by Media Monitor, an 
independent media watchdog, produced similar results.23 Th ai PBS’s Audience Council, modelled after the 
BBC initiative with the same name, was viewed as a bridge between the organization and its audience. 
However, according to the focus groups, some media professionals questioned the editorial independence of 
Th ai PBS and criticized it for not scrutinizing the government closely enough. Some viewers still struggled 
to diﬀ erentiate the public broadcaster from state broadcasters. For example, they could not distinguish Th ai 
PBS from the National Broadcasting Services of Th ailand (NBT), which is operated by the government’s 
Public Relations Department. Th is suggests that Th ai PBS has not yet established its identity among the 
broad public, which easily confuses public service broadcasting with state broadcasting.
As for content, Th ai PBS output was regarded by the focus group as predominantly factual, informative 
and ‘serious’. Th ese programs were considered by stakeholders as Th ai PBS’s strength and weakness at the 
same time. On the positive side, the documentaries and educational programs were considered to have 
22. Th ai PBS, “A Strategic Plan to Develop Digital Network Services”, 2010 (in Th ai).
23. For example, see Media Monitor, “A Survey of Terrestrial Televisions’ Schedules” (in Th ai), 2009, http://www.mediamonitor.in.th/home/ﬁ -
nal_report/pdf/pdf_issue_34.pdf (accessed April 2010). 
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high educational value. Many informants also believed that the programs were suﬃ  ciently diverse and 
suitable for people of all ages and needs. On the negative side, many programs were considered tedious and 
unattractive. Th is can be a serious problem since most viewers are used to entertainment programs, such as 
soap operas, game shows, reality shows, soft news and ‘news talk’ (hard news presented in highly simpliﬁ ed 
and opinionated ways). In addition, compared to its commercial counterparts, Th ai PBS programs were 
perceived as old-fashioned, especially by young people. 
Regarding news reporting, most informants in the focus groups, especially politicians, believed that Th ai 
PBS produced impartial news and provided balance for all parties to air their views. In other words, they 
considered the station as markedly diﬀ erent from NBT, which was seen as the government’s mouthpiece. 
Th ai PBS news and commentary programs were also viewed positively, in that they focused on regional and 
local issues and explained complicated issues by providing context. In terms of presentation, Th ai PBS was 
also perceived to be unique in that it did not produce any ‘news talk’ programs. 
On the other hand, some media professionals questioned the impartiality of Th ai PBS news and commentary, 
claiming they were subjective and biased towards the government at the expense of opposition voices. Th ey 
also claimed that its reporters and anchors lacked experience and were not knowledgeable enough to produce 
good quality news. Th is is partly because the station has had diﬃ  culty recruiting and maintaining talented 
staﬀ , due to budget constraints.
In sum, public perception of Th ai PBS appeared to be mixed, especially regarding its impartiality. Th is may 
be due to the fact that the agency started its operation during the time of intense political conﬂ ict that deeply 
polarized Th ai society. Th e perception of Th ai PBS may therefore reﬂ ect the wider political environment as 
much as the performance of the broadcaster. 
2.2.2 Public Service Provision in Commercial Media
Before 2008, no clear public service obligations were imposed on commercial media. In 2008, the Broadcasting 
Business Act replaced the outdated 1955 Broadcasting Act. Th e aim of the Act is to provide a legal framework 
for licensing and regulating public, community and commercial broadcasters. Commercial terrestrial licenses 
are further divided into national, regional and local (provincial) ones. Each licensee has to perform public 
service obligations according to its license type:
 All commercial licensees have to broadcast news and information programs for at least 25 percent of their 
total airtime (Article 33). 
 Regional (or local) commercial licensees have to broadcast regionally (or locally) produced programs 
meeting the minimum ratio set by the NBTC (Article 33).
 All licensees have to broadcast news and issue warnings in the event of a natural disaster or emergency, if 
requested by the competent authorities (Article 35). 
 To protect children and young people, all licensees must refrain from broadcasting certain types of 
programs during times speciﬁ ed by the NBTC (Article 34). 
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 To promote greater access to broadcasting programs for the disabled and the disadvantaged, all licensees 
must provide services appropriate to their viewing or listening in a manner established by the NBTC 
(Article 36). 
 All free-to-air commercial licensees are allowed to advertise no more than 12.5 minutes in any broadcasting 
hour and no more than 10 minutes per hour on average (Article 23). In addition, subscription-based 
broadcasters are allowed to advertise no more than 6 minutes in any broadcasting hour and no more than 
5 minutes per hour on average (Article 28).
 Licensees shall not broadcast programs that undermine the democratic regime, national security, public 
peace and morals, or air pornographic or obscene contents, or programs that cause severe degradation of 
people’s mental and physical health (Article 37).
It is important to note that most of the above provisions apply only to terrestrial broadcasters, which use the 
scarce analog spectrum. In other words, the regulation of satellite and cable television is more light-touch. 
Th ese obligations reﬂ ect the belief of the legislators that it is still necessary to regulate terrestrial broadcasters 
to promote the public interest, even in the digital age. 
On the surface, Article 37 may appear to open the door to state censorship. However, there is no requirement 
for a broadcaster to submit a program for regulatory checking before broadcasting. Th us a broadcaster 
can broadcast any material it chooses, but may be legally liable if found violating the law. If the clause is 
implemented illiberally, it may result in self-censorship by licensed broadcasters.
2.3 Assessments
Digital broadcasting has many important implications for Th ai PBS and other public broadcasters that will 
be set up in the future. On the positive side, public broadcasters should be able to provide more specialized 
programs to their viewers. However, more programs will require more investment, and public broadcasters 
may not be able to raise suﬃ  cient funds for this purpose. For example, the current annual tax revenue 
earmarked for the Th ai PBS is currently capped at THB 2 billion. Without an increase in funding, the Th ai 
PBS would face a dilemma. If it expands its services without more resources, the quality of its programs 
is likely to deteriorate. On the other hand, if it does not expand its services, it is likely to lose viewers in a 
competitive multi-channel environment. Digital broadcasting thus poses a serious challenge to the operation 
of public broadcasters. 
Th e rise of new media raises another potential threat, likely to be even more serious than digital broadcasting. 
As the younger generation switches to the internet, all terrestrial broadcasters stand to lose their audience 
bases. Th is threat will be especially pronounced for Th ai PBS in the long run, considering its viewers’ proﬁ le. 
Currently it has the lowest rating among “digital natives” (aged 14-25), and the highest rating among “digital 
aliens” (40+ years). If the station cannot appeal to the present young by providing them with programs of 
their interests, it will risk losing them even when they become older. As a result, its viewer base could shrink 
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signiﬁ cantly. According to internetworldstats.com, Th ailand has 16.1 million internet users in a population 
of 66 million. Manager.co.th, the most popular news website in Th ailand, already attracts around 300,000 
unique IP per day, close to the average Th ai PBS viewership of 316,169. Without a wider audience base, it 
could lose its legitimacy and would have diﬃ  culties facing the call to cut its funding. 
Whether the new media pose more of an opportunity or a threat to Th ai PBS depends very much on how 
it formulates a strategy for new media. At present, the internet is used as just another delivery platform or 
an archive for past television content without much interactivity. Based on this “Web 1.0” strategy, the Th ai 
PBS website only attracts 5,000–6,000 unique visitors per day, a mere 2 percent of that of Manager.co.th. 
Public service obligations imposed by the Broadcasting Business Act on commercial terrestrial broadcasters, 
including cable and satellite operators, reﬂ ect the belief of the legislators that public service obligations cannot 
be left solely to public and community broadcasters, and that it is still necessary to regulate the broadcasting 
media to promote public interest. Th is belief is also enshrined in the Constitution, which mandates that the 
frequency spectrum is a national resource and must be used in the public interest. 
M A P P I N G  D I G I T A L  M E D I A     T H A I L A N D3 0
3. Digital Media and Society
3.1 User-Generated Content (UGC)
3.1.1 UGC Overview
Table 18.
Top 10 most popular UGC websites in Th ailand (25 March 2010)






IP in Thailand 
(Truehits.net)
Daily Unique IP 
in Thailand 
(Trafﬁ cestimate.com)
Facebook Social network 539,587,000 4,310,000 n/a 711,578
YouTube Video sharing 410,180, 000 3,690,000 n/a 565,058
Hi5.com Social network 17,070, 000 2,740,000 n/a 812,800
Sanook.com (TH) Web portal 
and webboard 
2,800,000 2,610,000 685,848 694,308
Pantip.com (TH) Web portal 
and webboard
2,230,000 2,100,000 n/a 499,573
Blogger.com Weblog 203,770,000 2,030,000 n/a 303,192
Mthai.com (TH) Web portal 
and webboard
1,710,000 1,600,000 483,597 481,200
Dek-d.com (TH) Web portal 
and webboard
1,210,000 1,160,000 358,143 370,221
Manager.co.th (TH) Established 
media website
1,320,000 1,160,000 265,116 258,256
4shared.com File sharing 17,880,000 940,000 n/a 200,334
Note: * Reach measures the number of users. It is typically expressed as the percentage of all internet users who daily visit a given 
site. Th e numbers of total visitors in the world is 1,730 million users, based on World Internet users (internetworldstats.
com).
Sources: Calculated from Alexa.com, Traﬃ  cestimate.com, and Truehits.net.
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As in other countries, user-generated content (UGC) has spread along with Web 2.0 technologies. While 
there has been no systematic survey of the most popular types of UGC, some web information companies 
produce rough estimates (see Table 18). In addition, the NECTEC survey Internet User Proﬁ le of Th ailand 
2009, identiﬁ es certain popular online news sources, which can in turn be used to infer the popularity of 
UGC. Here we classify online news sources into four groups: webboards (internet forums or message boards 
for online conversations on current issues), websites of professional media organizations, weblogs (blogs), 
and social networks. 
Figure 7. 
Online news sources of choice
Note: Th e graph shows the percentage of people in the survey stating that they have experience consuming online news from 
the stated sources (multiple answers allowed).
Source: Adapted from NECTEC (2009).
Figure 7 shows that webboards are the most popular online news source, following by established media websites, 
blogs and social networks. Th e NECTEC survey broadly agrees with the rankings of the top 10 UGC websites 
shown in Table 18. Again, webboards appear to be the most popular UGC sources for online news. Personal 
blogs and social networks are more popular than professional media websites. Th e fact that personal UGC 
websites are highly popular news sources does not imply that established media websites are not inﬂ uential, 
since a large portion of content in personal UGC websites is drawn from mainstream media companies.
Table 19. 
Top 10 most popular UGC websites, grouped by online news sources
Sources Top 10 UGC websites
Webboard Sanook.com (#4), Pantip.com (#5), Mthai.com (#7), Dek-d.com (#8)
Website Manager.co.th (#9)
Weblog Blogger.com (#6)
Social Network Facebook.com (#1), Hi5.com (#3)
Sharing Site YouTube.com (#2), 4shared.com (#10)
Note: Numbers in the parentheses represent the ranks of the websites.
Source: Alexa.com, Traﬃ  cestimate.com, and Truehits.net.
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While social networks are relatively new, they have quickly gained popularity as platforms for exchanging 
information and opinions. During the intense political confrontation in March 2010, for example, six out of 
the ten most frequently used Th ai keywords on Twitter were related to the political situation. 
Table 20.
Ten most mentioned Th ai words in Twitter (accessed 3 April 2010)
# Words Hits per month
1 Red Shirts 33,598
2 Abhisit (Prime Minister) 22,583
3 Hot (weather) 19,981
4 Thaksin (former Prime Minister) 15,402
5 Demonstration 13,246
6 House Dissolution (implies early general election) 11,381





Website audiences can be estimated by the number of daily unique IPs, gathered by Truehits.com, a Th ai 
website, and Traﬃ  cestimate.com, a foreign website. Based on these sources, the total audience of the ten most 
popular independent UGC websites is around 3.96 million people, or 24.6 percent of Th ailand’s internet 
users and 5.9 percent of the total population.24 
3.1.2 Social Networks
As of late March 2010, it was still debatable whether Facebook or Hi5 was the most popular social networking 
site. According to Alexa, the most popular UGC website was Facebook, with 4.31 million members. An 
alternative source, Facebakers.com, estimated in March 2010 that there were 2.87 million Th ai Facebook 
members. However, Topspace, an online advertising agency, estimates that Hi5 has around 6 million members, 
far more than Facebook. It should be noted that Hi5’s six million members are based on registration, not 
actual usage. As a result, some of them are no longer active and many may have already migrated to Facebook. 
Although it is impossible to be sure, we believe that Facebook is becoming, if it is not already, the most 
popular UGC website in Th ailand. As for professional media websites, Manager.co.th appears to be the most 
popular, with around 260,000 visitors per day. 
24. Th is estimation assumes a one-to-one correspondence between a unique IP and an individual user. 
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Table 21 shows the ‘reach’ of the ten most popular social networks in Th ailand according to Alexa. (“Reach” 
is deﬁ ned as the number of internet users who visit on a daily basis, or active members.)
Table 21.
Ten most used social networks (as of 25 May 2010)




1 Facebook.com Social networks 539,587,000 4,310,000
2 YouTube.com Video sharing 410,180, 000 3,690,000
3 Hi5.com Social networks 17,070, 000 2,611,000
4 Blogger.com Weblog 203,770,000 2,240,000
5 4shared.com File sharing 17,880,000 940,000
6 Wikipedia.org Free encyclopaedia 223,320,000 1,340,000
7 Exteen.com (TH) Weblog 1,210,000 1,140,000
8 Bloggang.com (TH) Weblog 950,000 870,000
9 Multiply.com File sharing 5,840,000 660,000
10 Twitter.com Social network 101,180,000 600,000
Source: Alexa.
3.1.3 News in Social Media 
NECTEC’s Internet User Proﬁ le of Th ailand 2008 revealed that 49.1 percent of those surveyed had visited 
blogs to look for information, 23.4 percent for writing articles and 18.1 percent for expressing themselves.25 
Asked about online activities with friends or like-minded individuals, the surveyed group replied that the 
internet was for sharing data and knowledge (63.7 percent) and photos or video clips (59.1 percent). In 
addition, 57.2 percent responded that one major beneﬁ t of social networks is the ability to access ‘online 
knowledge sources.’ 
Th e 2009 survey found that 85.5 percent of those in the online survey had read news on the internet.26 
However, the frequency of reading online news is still quite low: 59 percent responded that they read online 
news only once or twice a week. Th e most frequently consumed news was political (35.7%), followed by 
social (20%), entertainment (17.1%), technology (10%), economic (8.9%), sport (6.6%), and education 
news (1.7%). Similarly, Th ailand Trending reported that the most frequently used Th ai keywords in Twitter 
were related to politics.27 
25. NECTEC, “Internet User Proﬁ le of Th ailand 2008”, accessed online from http://pld.nectec.or.th/websrii/images/stories/documents/books/
internetuser_2008.pdf March, 2010. 
26. NECTEC, Internet User Proﬁ le of Th ailand 2009 (ibid).
27. Accessed online from http://lab.in.th/thaitrend, on 28 March 2010. 
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Th ere is anecdotal evidence that social networks and blogs have become new ways for many Th ais to consume 
news and exchange opinions. Th ailand Trending reported that the most frequently used Th ai keywords in 
Twitter were related to politics.28 
3.2 Digital Activism
3.2.1 Digital Platforms and Civil Society Activism
Digital platforms have been used to organize political activism. Here are four recent prominent cases:
 ASTV & People Channel: Even before the Broadcasting Business Act of 2008, which liberalized the cable 
and satellite broadcasting markets, satellite television had become an important platform for partisan 
politics. Both sides have exploited satellite television, ASTV in the case of the ‘yellow shirts,’ and the 
People Channel in the case of the ‘red shirts,’ to criticize rivals, mobilize supporters, and raise funds. Both 
channels are broadcast by satellites registered overseas to avoid closure by the government. It should be 
noted that in this case satellite television is used by established political groups, rather than civil society 
movements. Th e results are impressive in the sense that both are highly popular among their supporters 
and have been able to help mobilize over 100,000 people to join their rallies. 
 Sniﬀ er: Early in 2010, Th an Sejthakit newspaper reported that the Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology (MICT) had asked the National Telecommunications Commission, the 
independent telecom regulator, to require internet service providers (ISPs) to install ‘sniﬀ ers’—software 
that monitors internet activity in order to capture ‘suspicious’ data. Th is news raised concerns among 
internet users that their privacy would be violated. A tweeter sent an alarm message to her 2,000 followers 
and the news spread fast through the online community, leading to a heated debate. One day after the 
news was released, a group called “Th ailand No Sniﬀ er” was established on Facebook and attracted over 
1,000 followers in just a few days. Soon afterwards, the Th ai Netizens Network, an online civic group, 
launched an anti-sniﬀ er campaign. Numerous questions and comments about sniﬀ ers were posted on 
the Prime Minister’s website (www.pm.go.th), compelling him to respond and the mainstream media 
to follow up. Th e fact that many prominent media professionals were active in social networking also 
contributed to the quick follow-up by the mainstream media, ﬁ rst by the press and then by television and 
radio. Fringer, a pro-free speech blogger, was invited to appear in many television programs. Pressured by 
netizens and the media, the MICT gave in and withdrew the implementation plan. 
 ‘Compulsory Licensing’ of lifesaving drugs: In 2006, the Ministry of Public Health issued compulsory 
licenses (CL) for drugs to treat AIDS, heart disease, and cancer, all of which claim thousands of lives 
every year. Th ese licenses granted a government-owned company the right to produce or import the 
drugs in question. 
28. Accessed online from http://lab.in.th/thaitrend, on 28 March 2010. 
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Th e government announced that this move was in accordance with the WTO’s intellectual property rights 
agreements. However, multinational pharmaceutical corporations, especially Abbott Laboratories, denounced 
the government in strong terms. Th is reaction caused local and international civil society organizations to 
rally in support of the policy, using the internet for communication, coordination, and resource mobilization 
to take political action at a transnational level.29 Th e CL movement network is characterized by the large 
number of participating organizations, ranging from local groups such as AIDS Access and Th ai Networks 
for People Living with HIV/AIDS to international groups such as Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 
the Clinton Foundation, Student Stop AIDS UK, Student Global AIDS Campaign, Consumer Projection 
on Technology (CPTECH), ACT-UP Paris, and UNAIDS. A major platform for communication was the 
Intellectual Property Group Email, which was used to share information and mobilize ﬁ nancial resources. For 
example, 20 organizations helped fund Jon Ungpakorn, a former senator, and other social activists to travel 
to the United States to lobby U.S. policymakers, Abbott shareholders, and the general public. A website, 
www.abbottsgreed.com, was created to inform the press and the public about the network and its activities.30 
Network members organized a series of high-proﬁ le protests. Th e Delhi Network of Positive People held 
a demonstration in New Delhi to show support for the Th ai government. In Paris, a group called Act Up-
Paris rallied in front of the Th ai Embassy when it was rumored that the government might backtrack. In 
Massachusetts, a group of students organized a “die-in protest” at a meeting of Abbott shareholders. Act Up-
Paris, with the cooperation of thousands of activists from India, Th ailand, Canada, and the United States, 
also conducted a ‘netstrike’ attack on Abbott’s website, causing it to crash. 
iLaw: iLaw (www.iLaw.or.th) is an online forum aimed at promoting citizen participation in the most 
upstream part of the legislative process: helping them to propose new laws. It adopts a three-step model: 
“think, draft and sign.” In the ﬁ rst stage, iLaw provides a forum for active citizens to propose an idea to 
change society by making new laws. For example, a law to legalize surrogate mothers was being discussed 
in 2010. In the second stage, details of the proposed laws are spelled out and drafted in a format ﬁ tting the 
Th ai legislative process by iLaw’s volunteer lawyers. Finally, at the signing stage, iLaw campaigns for voters’ 
signatures to meet the constitutional requirement of 10,000 signatures. To endorse a draft law, supporters 
must download a form from iLaw’s website, sign and send it to iLaw together with a copy of their identity 
card. As of mid-2010, iLaw was campaigning to abolish three security laws: the Internal Security Act, the 
Martial Act, and the Emergency Decree. From our observation, iLaw has succeeded in stimulating vigorous 
debate on its chosen topics, but has largely failed to translate debate into the signatures and actions needed 
to have a real impact. 
29. Elle, Kal, Th e Networking of Transnational Social Movements: Th e Case of Compulsory Licensing in Th ailand, Chulalongkorn University, 2008.
30. Although the website is no longer live, an archived version is available at http://web.archive.org/web/20080424010611rn_2/www.abbottsgreed.
com.
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3.2.2 The Importance of Digital Mobilizations
Internet guru Clay Shirky has deﬁ ned three diﬀ erent types of online activities, from the easiest to the most 
diﬃ  cult to organize.31 Th e ﬁ rst and the most basic type is information-sharing, such as uploading photographs 
or video clips. Th e second is cooperation and collaboration. Th e third, and most diﬃ  cult, is to mobilize 
people to take collective action in the real world. Fringer, a famous Th ai blogger, observed that many people 
were willing to take the ﬁ rst step of sharing information in the case of anti-sniﬀ er. In fact, it was quite easy 
for internet users to communicate with others in their circle. However, going from information-sharing to 
action, such as signing a petition with their real names to protest the MICT, was much more challenging. 
Th e experience of iLaw conﬁ rms this point. By contrast, the example of compulsory licensing shows that if 
the target groups are already organized and share the same beliefs, eﬀ ective action can be taken. 
3.3 Assessments
Social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, have rapidly grown in popularity. According to some sources, 
Th ailand had the highest growth of social media participation in the world in 2009.32 According to Th ailand 
Trending, there were more than 80,000 active Tweeples as of mid-2010. It is also estimated that there are 
2.87 million Facebook users. 
Social media contribute to news transmission in two ways. First, they expand the reach of mainstream media 
to those who might not form their regular audience. Table 22 shows the numbers of links from Twitter 
to websites of selected mainstream media during the time of intense political conﬂ ict in March 2010. For 
example, news from the Manager’s website was retransmitted by over 900 Tweeples to their peers, some 
of whom might not usually read the Manager. In this way, social media can strengthen the reach of the 
mainstream media. 
Second, social media can turn media consumers into media producers by letting them set their own news 
agenda without relying on mainstream outlets. Photos and video clips can be uploaded by eye-witnesses, along 
with text. Facebook was ﬂ ooded with photos and video clips taken by spectators during the political turmoil 
in 2010. In this way, social media may undermine the mainstream media monopoly of news production, 
rather than strengthening it as previously discussed. Th us the net impact of social media on mainstream 
media is still hard to determine.
31. Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: Th e Power of Organizing Without Organizations, Penguin Press (Reprint edition), 2009, pp. 47–54.
32. Th e Nation, available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/04/01/technology/Social-media-role-continues-to-grow-30126090.
html (accessed on 22 April 2010).
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Table 22.
Links from Twitter to mainstream media websites during March 2010











Note: Numbers are averaged for the period 14–28 March 2010.
Source: Backtweet.com, accessed 3 April 2010.
Activists have already employed the new media to take civil and political action, sometimes beyond national 
borders, as shown in the campaign to support compulsory licensing. So far, however, the general public has 
used the new media mainly for information-sharing and exchanging opinions. Th e example of iLaw shows 
that proceeding from online activism to action in the real world, such as signing a petition, is still a step too 
far for the general public. 
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4. Digital Media and Journalism
4.1 Impact on Journalists and Newsrooms
4.1.1 Journalists
Th e impact of digitization on journalists depends on the level of adoption of the new media in newsrooms. In 
general, journalists have been aﬀ ected by digitization in three main aspects: modifying the editorial workﬂ ow, 
accelerating the process of news production, and changing the news-gathering practices. 
Concerning editorial workﬂ ow, journalists in some outlets have been urged to embrace multitasking and 
multimedia reporting. For example, Mango TV, a satellite television subsidiary of the Nation Multimedia 
Group, which also broadcasts via local cable TV, mobile phone, and the internet, aims to develop a new 
generation of “Mojos”, or mobile journalists. Th e Mojos are expected to be able to interview, take photos or 
video, produce, edit, broadcast or publish the content, send mobile news and update content on social media. 
Th ey are also trained to be capable of transforming a piece of information into multiple types of content 
suited for diﬀ erent platforms: website, social media, mobile devices, and television. 
With a somewhat lower level of digitization, Prachachart Turakij, a business newspaper well known for its 
investigative reporting, requires its staﬀ  to work simultaneously on print and online editions. Th is requirement 
coincides with the newspaper’s move to expand its business online. 
 
Under a new editorial workﬂ ow plan, journalists will be given more authority to work and publish with less 
editorial oversight. For example, a number of pre-selected journalists at Prachachart Turakij are authorized to 
publish stories on the website without passing through the usual editorial process. Yet, this kind of freedom 
is not applicable to most other staﬀ  members of Prachachart Turakij, who still have to undergo the usual 
rigorous editorial check. On the other hand, journalists at the Nation Multimedia Group are trusted to send 
mobile news or publish online news without passing through the hands of a sub-editor. Th is delegation of 
authority is due to the need for speed of reporting and the need to cut costs during the economic downturn, 
as well as to the more general competitive commercial pressures on the media. 
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Some media companies have grasped the opportunity to supply news to websites or mobile devices throughout 
the 24-hour news cycle. Th e Manager Group is a leading example of a mainstream media company that has 
been able to exploit the internet to report breaking news. As a result of heavy investment in online content 
production, it has been able to attract a large audience to its website, which currently ranks number one for 
online news. Other mainstream media companies are also trying to catch up. For example, the Bangkok Post 
and Post Today are experimenting with ‘e-papers’, which allow readers to access the newspapers via iPad and 
iPhone apps. On the other hand, top sellers such as Th ai Rath and Daily News have been slow to experiment 
with new media, apart from operating simple websites and selling SMS-based news alert services. 
As for news-gathering practices, the internet has long been an important tool for journalists to gather 
information even for traditional media. Some use the internet intensively, to the extent that they become 
‘armchair journalists.’ Increasing storage capacity and searchability make it more convenient for journalists to 
get access to new pools of information. UGC is monitored and picked up by journalists if it is newsworthy. 
Interactivity also makes it possible for audiences’ perspectives to become part of the publication process, such 
as through comments at the foot of articles. 
Although journalists cannot aﬀ ord to ignore digital reporting in the long run, technological change has 
presented great challenges. Digital transition in the newsrooms has never been smooth. Unlike their younger 
counterparts, older journalists have resisted the new editorial workﬂ ow as they feel uncomfortable with 
multimedia and social networking technologies. For them, producing news around the clock and distributing 
it to multiple platforms seems overly demanding.
While there has been no systematic research into the impact of new media on the quality of journalism, 
the proportion of aggregated content to original content in online outlets appears to have increased over 
time. Th is results from changes at both the organizational and the individual level. At the organizational 
level, many traditional outlets, especially newspapers, have suﬀ ered from a decrease in advertising revenue as 
advertising spending on newspapers dwindled from THB 22.5 billion in 2008 to THB 19.5 billion in 2009, 
equivalent to a 13.3 percent decrease in one year. Th is has forced them to cut investment in original content 
and rely more on less expensive news sources, such as press releases. At the individual level, the expansion of 
digital media outlets, without an accompanying increase in manpower, forces journalists to seek information 
online, which is far less time-consuming. Th e internet even makes it possible for journalists to copy and paste 
free online information from other news agencies. 
Second, demand for speed seems to prevail over accuracy when it comes to online reporting, and the 
competitive pressure has knock-on eﬀ ects on quality in oﬄ  ine journalism as well. Many media organizations 
have set up separate online editorial teams. However, most appear to be understaﬀ ed because online news has 
not become a main source of revenue. For example, unlike the news in the printed version, English-language 
news on Th e Nation’s website is not sub-edited by native English speakers, allowing some grammatical and 
spelling errors to creep in. One of the journalists interviewed estimated that around 10 to 20 percent of online 
news contains mistakes. Although online news can be easily corrected after publication, rapid dissemination 
makes inaccuracies potentially more harmful. For online news, the job of checking for accuracy is partly 
delegated to unpaid readers, who may or may not be capable of detecting mistakes. 
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Th ird, the impact of new media on investigative news is still unclear. On the one hand, the imperative of 
speed does not encourage deep or investigative news. On the other hand, some journalists contend that only 
by producing original and investigative news can traditional media diﬀ erentiate themselves from competing 
online media.
Th e exploitation of new media to ﬁ nd more varied news sources or include a wider range of voices in the 
editorial process has not taken oﬀ  among professional journalists. Sometimes the news agenda has been 
inﬂ uenced by UGC, and audience viewpoints solicited online have been incorporated in the news in many 
forms, including online polls. However, UGC or audience viewpoints have not been granted much importance 
because of the diﬃ  culty of verifying their information. Journalistic practises, and the determination of some 
professionals to diﬀ erentiate themselves from amateur journalists, also contribute to the low usage of UGC 
in the mainstream media. 
4.1.2 Ethics 
Th e proliferation of digital news media—cable and satellite television, online newspapers, and social 
networking—has blurred the line between professional and amateur journalism. In principle, what 
distinguishes professional journalists from other content-providers are strict standards of conduct which 
support such principles as accuracy, balance, thoroughness, respect for privacy, and the right to reply. Th e 
staﬀ  at traditional media outlets are expected to conform to codes of ethics. Amateur journalists have yet to 
set up similar standards. 
Since the Broadcasting Business Act liberalized the electronic media, many organizations have emerged that 
claim to be professional outlets but do not comply with existing standards of conduct. Some are overtly 
partisan. For example, PTV and ASTV, broadcast through satellite and local cable television, are ﬁ nanced by 
politically motivated tycoons or even by politicians themselves. News produced by these media is predictably 
heavily biased, such that at times it amounts to nothing more than propaganda or rumor. Th is phenomenon 
has emerged because the liberalization coincided with the deep political conﬂ icts in the country.
Another more complicated issue is how to judge online media that claim to provide alternative views, such 
as Prachatai.com. Financed by non-governmental organization (NGO) and individual donations, Prachatai 
claims to provide space for people who do not have a chance to voice their opinions or concerns in the 
mainstream media. During the political conﬂ ict of 2010, Prachatai appeared to lean towards the ‘red shirts’, 
perhaps believing they were under-represented in the mainstream media or because they shared similar 
ideological positions. Th e key issue is whether alternative information sources such as Prachatai should also 
be judged by traditional standards of accuracy, balance, thoroughness, and so forth. One may argue that 
online media do not need to conform to such standards because, in the online environment, audiences have 
more control over what they consume than in the traditional media environment. 
Another problem with online information sources is that it is diﬃ  cult to check their origin and hence their 
reliability. As a result, misquotation is common. Plagiarism by cutting and pasting articles, copying photos, 
graphics, and video is becoming a big problem. Before the advent of the internet, careless journalists who 
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used ﬂ oppy disks to duplicate other reporters’ news became known as “A-drive” journalists. Now it is even 
easier for journalists to copy contents from some websites without crediting the author or the original source. 
Pictures taken and posted by amateur photographers are often used without permission.33 
Th e loss of advertising revenue in printed media, partly caused by digital technology, has driven certain 
media companies to adopt practices that may compromise their journalistic integrity. For example, after the 
Matichon Group accepted a commission to organize events for the Ministry of ICT, these events were given 
full coverage in the press despite the fact that much of the content was not newsworthy. 
4.2 Investigative Journalism
4.2.1 Opportunities
Generally speaking, digital media have not been used much for investigative journalism. It is true that 
digitization allows journalists to ﬁ nd general information more easily, including background that can help 
them better understand the context of what they are investigating. Digital media also help journalists to 
solicit opinions from many sources. However, all good journalism, including investigative reporting, has to 
go beyond the screen to get what it needs. 
Th is is not to downplay the opportunities digital media may bring to ‘citizen journalists’, who can play very 
important roles in investigative reporting at the local level. With the help of digital media, local issues can 
be easily brought to the attention of those at the national level. Th at was the idea behind Prachadham, an 
investigative local news website. 
According to Mana Trirayapiwat, a lecturer in media studies, Th ai news journalists have not yet grasped the 
full potential of social media.34 In his opinion, social media technology can be used for gathering knowledge 
from experts on particular issues. For example, during the dispute between Th ailand and Cambodia on the 
issue of the Khao Phra Viharn Temple, in 2008, the Nation Group received in-depth information from its 
readers’ blogs. Some of these bloggers turned out to be famous historians.35 However, this example seems to 
be an exception rather than the rule. 
4.2.2 Threats
Violence poses the most serious threat to journalists who cover sensitive issues related to local inﬂ uences, 
such as illegal logging and smuggling, whether in traditional or digital media. Defamation actions present 
the second major threat. In Th ailand, defamation lawsuits can be ﬁ led as criminal or civil cases, or both, and 
33. Interview with a journalist working for an English-language newspaper in Th ailand, 13 April 2010.
34. Speech given at the seminar, “Journalist 3.0: Tough Situation for Th ai Media”, 8 March 2010, text accessed online from http://www.tja.or.th/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1526:-30-----2553&catid=34:journalist-day&Itemid=21 (accessed in April, 2010).
35. Interview with Adisak Limparungphathanakit, Managing Director of Broadcasting Business of Nation Multimedia Group, April 2010.
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often result in self-censorship by media organizations.36 Digitization can potentially magnify such threats, 
leading to even more self-censorship. A number of recent cases show that media organizations can be sued 
over content they published online. In some cases, misinformation was rapidly corrected in the printed 
media, but not online. With the greater space available, online news often contains information that does not 
appear in printed versions. Still, such information can be used as evidence in lawsuits. Moreover, as online 
reporting is not limited to any particular location, defamation lawsuits can be ﬁ led in many jurisdictions. Th e 
threats from online defamation suits thus are very serious for investigative journalists and media companies.37 
4.2.3 New Platforms
While online publication can accelerate the distribution of breaking news, it does not seem to have had 
much impact on investigative journalism. Exclusive news is generally not published online because most Th ai 
editorial managers think that it can help boost the circulation of the printed press. 
Digitization encourages the convergence of professional and citizen journalists by facilitating the ﬂ ow of 
information between them. Professional and citizen journalists may have diﬀ erent working styles but they 
work in a complementary manner. Th eir synergy increases news quality and impact. Some investigative news 
produced by professional media can be easily and immediately disseminated to online readers and hotly 
debated if it gains their attention, greatly enhancing its impact. 
Certain important topics emerged in online discussions before they were reported by professional media. Th e 
January 2010 controversy over the GT200 bomb detector, used by the Th ai military, is one. Th is debate was 
initiated by Jessada Denduangborriphan, a university professor, who publicized the device’s ineﬀ ectiveness 
on a webboard of the popular Pantip.com site. To support his argument, he uploaded a video clip from the 
BBC’s Newsnight program, which showed that the device could not detect explosives as well as its producer 
claimed. Participants in the ensuing online debate urged the professional media to investigate the subject and 
turn it into national news. After a systematic test of the GT200, the government terminated procurement.
4.2.4 Dissemination and Impact
All journalists interviewed agree that citizen journalists play a very active role in investigative journalism. 
With the help of social networking technologies, consumers are not only just passive news recipients, but also 
civic reporters. Th e cases of the bomb detectors (see section 4.3.4) and of the internet ‘sniﬀ er’ software (see 
section 3.2.1) show how citizen journalists can help to bring about real policy change. 
A third case that shows the power of citizen journalism was the exposure of Nathan Oman by the so-called 
‘Pantip Detectives’. In early 2010, Nathan Oman, a young singer and ﬁ lm star, claimed publicly that 20th 
Century Fox had hired him to star in a Hollywood movie with Bruce Willis and Nina Ricci, directed by 
36. Interview with Adisak Limparungphathanakit.
37. Interview with Adisak Limparungphathanakit.
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Wolfgang Peterson. On a Pantip webboard, sceptics calling themselves the ‘Pantip Detectives’ carried out 
a collaborative investigation and discovered that Oman had lied. Th ey also found that photographs Oman 
posted on his Hi5 social network were from some unrelated event. 
Th ese cases demonstrate the power of civic collaboration through social networking to expose lies wittingly 
or unwittingly disseminated by mainstream media, and sometimes to change public policies or government 
practices. It should be noted, however, that while all these issues were initiated in the online world, they came 
to the attention of the public at large only after the issue was picked up by the mainstream media. While 
the new media are increasingly powerful, they continue to rely on established mainstream media to achieve 
a tangible impact. Th us a typical life cycle of high-impact online news consists of the following sequence: a) 
the mainstream media propagate some misinformation, b) the information is investigated and exposed by the 
online community, and c) the investigative work of the online community is echoed back in the mainstream 
media and generates an impact.
4.3 Social and Cultural Diversity
4.3.1 Sensitive Issues
Th e most sensitive issue for the media is the monarchy. It is sensitive in cultural, social, and legal terms. Like all 
its predecessors, the 2007 Constitution states that “Th e King shall be enthroned in a position of revered worship 
and shall not be violated. No person shall expose the King to any sort of accusation or action.” Th e Criminal 
Code prohibits lèse majesté by stipulating that, “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, the Queen, 
the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to ﬁ fteen years.” Culturally and 
socially, the majority of Th ais have the highest respect for the King. It is thus considered unacceptable for anyone 
to criticize or make derogatory remarks in public about the sovereign or the Royal Family. 
Another sensitive issue is the conﬂ ict in Th ailand’s three southernmost provinces, where the majority 
population is ethnically Malay and Islamic by confession. Th e conﬂ ict can be traced back to the so-called 
‘nation-building’ period in the late 1930s and the 1940s, when governments tried to assimilate all ethnic 
minorities into Th ai society. Th e Muslim Malays in these provinces reacted strongly against this policy. Some 
Muslim separatist groups have long attempted to establish an independent state. In 2004, the situation in 
these provinces suddenly became violent, leading to the deaths of thousands of people, including many 
Muslims, Buddhists, and government oﬃ  cials. Media organizations have taken care to avoid inciting hatred 
between Muslims and Buddhists. Th e challenge facing newsrooms is how to diﬀ erentiate the southern 
separatist movement from the broader Muslim community. 
Other issues related to minority groups concern Burmese migrants, Vietnamese, Laotian, Hmong, hill-
tribe people, and homosexuals. However, these issues are not perceived to be highly sensitive in the wider 
society and the media are able to discuss them openly, sometimes even with overt prejudice. Th e National 
Press Council has issued codes of conduct for reporting on certain minority groups. However, there is no 
requirement for minority coverage or program quotas in the broadcast media.
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4.3.2 Coverage of Sensitive Issues 
With the help of modern information technology, a number of news websites dedicated to ethnic minorities 
and other disadvantaged groups have been set up to respond to demands for human rights, equality, and 
social justice. Th ese include Isranews.org, Th aipeoplepress.com, Prachatam.com, Deepsouthwatch.org, and 
Salweennews.org. In fact, almost every active community and NGO has its own website. 
Th e establishment of Th ai PBS gave these concerns a new foothold in the mainstream media, greatly 
increasing the public space for groups that have been under-represented in Th ai society. Th e station broadcasts 
a regional program called “D Slatun” in ﬁ ve southern provinces with substantial Muslim populations. It also 
allocates prime-time slots for citizen journalists, who report on local issues mostly from the perspective of 
disadvantaged people. Some television stations, which had provided almost no coverage of disadvantaged 
groups, have followed suit, by granting some—though very little—airtime to these groups of people. 
Media coverage of inter-ethnic tension between Muslim Malays and Th ais in the three southernmost provinces 
has changed remarkably over recent years. Previously, Muslim Malay issues were covered by stringers rather 
than professional journalists. Th e tensions were presented as the result of violent religious or ethnic conﬂ icts 
or separatism. In other words, the issue was mostly framed in terms of illegitimate goals and criminal action 
by one side. Th e delicate issue concerning the culture and identity of Muslim Malays was rarely reported by 
the traditional media. Also, the fact that many Muslims were mistreated and tortured by the Th ai authorities 
was not reported. 
Since the founding of the Isra News Center in 2005, a collaborative venture by several major Th ai newspapers, 
coverage of Muslim Malays has both increased and improved. Th is is because major newspapers sent their staﬀ  
journalists to work with local stringers in the ﬁ eld. With the changes in the way news is gathered, long-ignored 
issues such as Muslim religious belief and Malay culture gained additional space in the traditional media, 
which has improved public understanding of Th ailand’s cultural and religious diversity. Other problems 
in these areas, such as people going missing and other human rights violations, have also been exposed. 
Investigative news also turned the spotlight on how government policies and military action have created 
problems rather than solving them. Overall, the portrayal of Muslim Malays today is more balanced and the 
voices of local people are better presented in news due to the eﬀ orts of major newspapers. Unfortunately, due 
to limited resources, the partner newspapers have withdrawn their journalists from the area and put reporting 
back in the hands of stringers. 
In sum, new media are able to facilitate coverage of sensitive issues at a lower cost and thus enable Prachatham, 
Deepsouthwatch, and others to become alternative sources. However, the factor that decides whether unheard 
voices are indeed heard is still the commitment of the mainstream media, which have far more resources and 
distribution power than the alternative sources. Th e situation may change once the internet penetration rate 
reaches a critical level. 
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4.3.3 Space for Public Expression
Th e Isra News Center has used digital media to disseminate news since its founding. Deepsouthwatch.org, 
run by a network of local people, scholars, university students, journalists, and non-governmental activists, 
also uses a website and social media as the main means for internal and external communication. Other news 
websites such as Wevoicepeace.org, Bungarayanews.com, and Amannews.org, run by local Muslims, have 
also emerged, increasing the space available for public expression by Muslims. 
However, the impact of online reporting has been very limited in the three southernmost provinces themselves 
because internet penetration in the area is very low. Also, there appears to be a religious belief that the internet 
will bring evil things to its users.38 News from those websites is thus distributed to people in the area by local 
radio. It should also be noted that, unlike the Isra News Center’s site, sites run by local people have received 
very little, if any, attention from the mainstream media.
4.4 Political Diversity
4.4.1 Elections and Political Coverage
Th e emergence of digital media has not led to any change in the regulation of media in elections. Th e 
Election Commission’s regulations allow candidates to use any media, including websites and electronic 
media, to seek voter support. Any prohibitions on political communication by a candidate apply equally to 
all media, including digital media. For example, it is prohibited by the law to conduct an election campaign 
from 6 p.m. on the eve of elections until the end of election day. Th is applies equally to online campaigning. 
In the past, candidates have been charged for violating the regulations by misusing websites. 
4.4.2 Digital Political Communications 
Digital media have profoundly enhanced the diversity of voices. Th e internet has stimulated the rise 
of amateur journalism, as can be seen from the emergence of so-called ‘middle’ and ‘micro’ media. Th e 
‘middle media’ include alternative media websites (such as Prachatai.com, Prachatam.com, Onopen.com, 
and Deepsouthwatch.com), non-governmental organization websites (such as Consumerthai.org, Flc.or.th, 
Bannok.com, Th ainetizen.org, and iLaw.or.th), collective blogs, and Facebook groups (such as Th ailand No 
Sniﬀ er, Stop GT200, and Watch Red Shirt). Th ey have contributed to the increase in political discourse in 
the digital world. On the other hand, ‘micro media’, which include personal blogs and social media, are used 
for media consumption and information-sharing among individuals. 
Th e use of new media to enlarge the political space was put to the test when the Ministry of ICT blocked 
Prachatai’s website in April, 2010, forcing its users to get proxy access to its website or to become fans of 
38. For example, see Somkid Leewan, “Islamic Attitudes Towards the Internet” (in Th ai), available at  http://www.quranthaikt.com/main/content.
php?page=sub&category=7&id=15 (accessed 15 June 2010). 
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Prachatai’s page on Facebook. Th e emergence of digital satellite and cable television has also resulted in an 
array of political groups becoming media operators, as discussed in the cases of PTV, ASTV, and Voice TV.
New media have also been widely employed by politicians to communicate directly with their supporters. 
For example, Abhisit Vejjajiva, the current prime minister, has a Twitter account (@PM_Abhisit), a Facebook 
page, a channel on YouTube (www.youtube.com/abhisitorg), and both personal (Abhisit.org) and oﬃ  cial 
(Pm.go.th) websites. His main political rival, former prime minister Th aksin Shinawatra, who is in exile 
evading a jail term for corruption, uses similar techniques. All major political parties have their own websites 
and some, including the ruling Democrat Party, even use social networks, e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube, to communicate with voters. 
Nevertheless, the professional media organizations still play a decisive role in setting the national news agenda. 
Th is is due to the low rate of internet penetration of only 20.1 percent of the population. Even if a political 
issue originates in the new media, most people will not recognize it unless it is picked up by mainstream 
media. A hotly debated issue on Twitter would circulate among no more than 80,000 users. 
Yet, according to the journalists interviewed for this report, professional media often compete for interesting 
online stories. Th ey estimated that around 80 percent of journalists make regular use of social media to gather 
information, and that around 20 percent are highly active users. Some of these users choose the new media 
channel to report longer versions of stories in the press. Doing so does not, however, oﬀ er them protection 
from lawsuits. 
While digital media increase the diversity of sources, ultimately the readers decide which information they 
choose to consume. In a highly polarized society, characterized by intense political conﬂ ict, people tend to 
adhere to information sources that match their ideological leanings. As noted above (see section 1.3.3), the 
so-called red shirts watched PTV and the yellow shirts, ASTV. Th e more competition there is in the media 
marketplace, the more important balanced reporting has become. 
4.5 Assessments
 
Th e new media have had an uneven impact on professional journalists, depending on the strategies and 
business models of their organizations. While the work of most mainstream journalists may remain pretty 
much the same, journalists who work in the new media are increasingly forced to adapt to the digital 
environment. First, they are required to be multimedia journalists, adept on multiple platforms. Many of 
them need to learn to use new equipment such as the BlackBerry, iPhone, or other devices for mobile 
reporting. Second, they are pushed to adapt to the new 24-hour news cycle. 
It is debatable whether the requirement for faster reporting and multiple platform skills will improve or 
worsen the quality of journalism. Some believe that round-the-clock reporting helps journalists to keep 
abreast of important details and write a more accurate ﬁ nal draft. Others believe that the requirement for 
4 7O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 1
immediacy and the additional workload will exhaust journalists’ time and energy to the point that they can 
no longer produce well-researched journalism, or investigative journalism of any kind. In other words, the 
new media are likely to increase the quantity and speed of news production, but at the price of reducing 
investigative news and overall quality. In addition, inaccuracy is likely to increase due to the greater workload, 
abbreviated editorial process, and insuﬃ  cient investment in human resources. However, both sides agree 
that the most decisive factor for the quality of journalism is the quality and dedication of the journalists 
themselves, which are relatively independent of media platforms.
Digitization has not signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected the way elections are covered. Journalists, politicians and regulators 
see digital media as just another platform. As for marginalized groups, new media have been used to enhance 
their voices, as shown in the case of Muslim Malays, the disabled, and immigrant labor. However, the actual 
impact depends largely on whether new media reports are picked up by mainstream media.
Digital media have not been much used for investigative journalism. Journalists still need access to primary 
sources for important information if they are to carry out insightful investigations. However, the internet 
has proven to be highly helpful in producing well-researched news that requires enormous background 
information.
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5. Digital Media and Technology
5.1 Spectrum
5.1.1 Spectrum Allocation Policy
Th ere is currently no oﬃ  cial spectrum allocation policy for broadcasting. Rights to spectrum use have been 
granted on the basis of concessions. Th ere are many concession-granting agencies, but the main ones are the 
military, the government’s Public Relations Department (PRD), and the Mass Communication Organization 
of Th ailand (MCOT). Th is fragmented system means that the conditions attached to spectrum use depend 
on the particular deal between the concessionaires and the concession-granting agencies. For example, the 
Channel 3 concession, granted by the MCOT, and the Channel 7 concession, granted by the army, diﬀ er in 
length of term, annual fees and other respects. 
Behind this archaic system is the fact that almost all radio frequencies are hoarded by the three state agencies 
in the name of security (in the case of the army) or of the need for the government to communicate with 
the public (in the case of the PRD and MCOT). In practice, frequencies are issued to private operators for 
commercial use through concessions, which are granted according to a patronage system.39 Th e status quo 
thus supports a privileged few.
Attempts to reform this rotten system started over a decade ago when the 1997 Constitution came into 
force. Section 40 of the Constitution stipulates that the frequency spectrum is a national resource and must 
be used in the public interest. To put an end to the concession system, the Constitution also requires that 
the frequency spectrum be allocated by the broadcasting regulator, the National Broadcasting Commission 
(NBC), and the telecom regulator, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). 
39. For instance, in 1997, an army chief furtively extended the concession contract of Channel 7 for another 25 years, 10 years ahead of its expira-
tion, presumably to help the station avoid any possible frequency reallocation by the regulator to be established after the passage of the 1997 
Constitution.
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As the borders between telecom and broadcasting services are increasingly blurred, the 2007 Constitution, 
drafted after the coup in 2006, mandates a merger between the NBC and the NTC to form the National 
Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC). Following the passage of the NBTC Act into 
law in December 2010, the body of 11 NBTC commissioners must be appointed within 180 days. 
Th e NBTC Act requires the NBTC to draft a spectrum allocation master plan. Th e plan will determine how 
frequency spectrum is to be allocated for public, commercial, and community services. Th e Act also stipulates 
that auction is the only acceptable means of allocating spectrum for commercial services. Th is reﬂ ects the 
legislators’ belief that auction is the most transparent process and an eﬀ ective method to move away from 
the patronage system. However, the Act does not specify any allocation methods for community and public 
broadcasting services. It only states that license fees for those services may be lower than for commercial 
broadcasters, in order to reﬂ ect their not-for-proﬁ t nature. 
For radio, the Act also mandates that at least 20 percent of the spectrum must be used for community 
ser vices. A similar provision applies to television, but only after the completion of the digital switchover. In 
addition, the Act sets up a Fund for Broadcasting and Telecommunications Development to provide ﬁ nancial 
support for the operation of community radio and other activities related to the public interest. Th e Fund 
will be ﬁ nanced by license fees and spectrum auction revenues paid by broadcasting operators. 
Th e Broadcasting Business Act of 2008 also introduces a licensing system for public services. Th ose entitled 
to apply for a license in this category are state agencies (excluding state enterprises), civil society groups, 
and higher education institutes. Th e Broadcasting Business Act and the NBTC Act are expected to increase 
signiﬁ cantly the use of spectrum for public purposes. With the system of public service licenses and the 
public service obligations imposed on commercial terrestrial broadcasters (see section 2.2.2), the Broadcasting 
Business Act provides a major step to ensure that the liberalized broadcasting market will not be too lopsided 
in favor of commercial media that seek only to maximize proﬁ ts. 
However, the reform has not been smooth. Most importantly, the selection of the NBC has been delayed for a 
decade by legal disputes over the selection process. Th e long-awaited NBTC Act, which aims at reducing such 
legal disputes, was only completed in December 2010. Th is means that there is still no broadcasting regulator, 
whether separate or converged. Even after the regulator has been put in place, it will not be immediately 
obvious whether the law is being implemented according to its intention. In addition, vested interests may 
continue to use legal tactics to maintain the status quo.
5.1.2 Transparency 
As discussed above, a few state agencies have hoarded most of the spectrum since the beginning of spectrum 
usage in Th ailand. Th ey have in turn allocated spectrum to certain private operators, mostly based on 
favoritism. While this means of assignment helps release spectrum to the private sector, only well-connected 
ﬁ rms are able to obtain concessions. Th ese concession-based operators are generally required to pay a 
percentage of their revenue to the concession-giving authorities. In addition, it is widely believed that they 
are also required to pay illegal payments in most concessions. 
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After the enactment of the 1997 Constitution, which paved the way for the use of spectrum in the public 
interest, a dozen non-commercial community radios started operating without licenses. Th e rush to enter the 
market was based on the expectation that early applicants would be more likely to get licenses once the regulator 
was set up. When the Th aksin administration made a serious mistake in 2005, by allowing community 
radios to air advertisements, thousands of local commercial stations also started to operate, pretending to be 
community radios. Most of them broadcast on FM frequency bands. Although the transmission power of 
these stations is limited to 30 watts and the antenna height to 30 meters, these restrictions are not strictly 
enforced. Interference among radio stations thus became a serious problem in many areas, and discouraged 
market entry by concession-based stations. Again, the lack of a regulator means that these problems have not 
been addressed. 
5.1.3 Competition for Spectrum
In 2009, the NTC commissioned the National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) 
to conduct a study of digital transition for terrestrial television. Th e study recommended that the digital 
dividend be distributed as recommended by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). It is 
unclear what this would mean for Th ailand as the ITU has yet to report its technical studies to the World 
Radiocommunication Conference, planned for 2012.
Table 23.
Proposal for spectrum reallocation for digital terrestrial television
Band VHF I VHF III UHF IV UHF V
Frequency Band 47–68 MHz 174–230 MHz 510–582 MHz 582–698 MHz 698–790 MHz
Transmission 
Band width (MHz)
21 56 72 116 92
















Source:  NECTEC, 2009. 
It should be noted that this proposal is not legally binding and may not even reﬂ ect the thinking of the future 
NBTC. Until the frequency master plan and the digitization transition plan have been drafted, there will be 
no clear policy direction on how the digital dividend will be distributed. 
5.2 Digital Gatekeeping
5.2.1 Technical Standards
Representatives of all terrestrial television stations convened in April 2007 to discuss the technical standards 
for digital terrestrial television. Th e meeting was organized by the government’s Public Relations Department. 
Th e representatives suggested that Th ailand should use the Digital Video Broadcasting–Terrestrial (DVB-T) 
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standard adopted by many European countries. In their opinion, while DVB-T may not be the most 
technologically advanced standard, it is the most suitable for Th ailand. Th e NTC study on Technical 
Standards for Digital Terrestrial Television arrived at the same conclusion, for the following reasons:
1. DVB-T is designed to be a direct replacement of the PAL B/G 625 50Hz standard for analog television.
2. It is developed as the enhancement of the DVB-S standard, which has proved to be spectrum eﬃ  cient.
3. It is resistant to echo and multi-path noises.
4. It allows clear transmission in moving vehicles and mobile devices.
5. It enables both standard-deﬁ nition television (SDTV) and high-deﬁ nition television (HDTV) services, 
as well as a combination of the two.
6. It is able to support both stationary television (based on DVB-T) and mobile television (based on 
DVB-H) services in the same channel.
7. It enables easy allocation of frequencies, and is relatively inexpensive due to the ability to utilize the same 
frequencies similarly to a single frequency network (SFN).
8. It allows various customizable variables and parameter formats.
9. It enables add-on services via data broadcasting technology.
10. Television receivers and set-top boxes based on this standard are cheaper than those based on other 
standards. 
A public consultation was held to discuss the NTC study. Although some argued that there should be a trial 
to compare the performance of DVB-T compared with the Japanese ISDB-T standard, most participants 
agreed that DVB-T was most appropriate for Th ailand. 
Th e ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information (AMRI), meeting in Jakarta in May 2007, also supported 
DVB-T as the common standard for digital terrestrial transmission. Th erefore, it is highly likely that Th ailand 
will adopt this standard, even though there has been no oﬃ  cial decision. 
With the cost of a built-in digital tuner or a set-top box still around THB 1,000–2,000 (US$30–60), there 
are concerns that the adoption rate of digital terrestrial television will be slow. NECTEC has suggested that 
the government should accelerate the adoption rate by subsidizing poor households to buy set-top boxes (see 
section 7.1).
5.2.2 Gatekeepers 
While there are no obvious gatekeepers in the free-to-air television market, there are concerns about 
monopolization in the national subscription television market. In particular, True Visions, the cable subsidiary 
of True, a listed company whose majority shareholder is the giant Charoen Pokphand Group, Asia’s largest 
agro-conglomerate, has long been accused of acquiring exclusive rights to many premium programs, such 
as English Premier League football, HBO and the Discovery Channel, and abusing its market power as the 
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largest subscription television company in the national market. As the competition authority in Th ailand has 
been notoriously weak, there has been no recent investigation into the company’s conduct.40 
After the market liberalization that came with the Broadcasting Business Act, over 100 small local cable 
operators formed an alliance under the name Cable Th ai Holding (CTH). CTH executives claimed that 
setting up a holding company was crucial for the survival of their members, which needed to increase their 
bargaining power in procuring programs to compete with True Visions and satellite operators. 
While the emergence of the CTH may increase the competitiveness of its members as a whole, it creates 
a dilemma for some small cable companies. Ironically, the CTH has adopted the same strategy as True 
Visions in that it buys exclusive rights to remaining premium programs. It also tries to coerce local operators 
to become members and bundles the rights to broadcast its programs. CTH has also threatened to ﬁ le a 
complaint with the NTC against operators that broadcast pirated programs. As of March 2010, about 80 
percent of local cable operators had joined the Holding. 
5.2.3 Transmission Networks
According to the Broadcasting Business Act of 2008, network owners are required to share their infrastructure 
with other licensees. While the Act aims to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks and thus facilitate the entry of 
new operators, its eﬀ ectiveness has never been tested as the NBTC is expected to be established in mid-2011. 
In addition, it is unclear whether only passive network elements (such as ducts and poles) or both passive and 
active network elements (such as transmitters) are required to be shared, and if so, at what cost. Experience 
in other markets shows that the problem of infrastructure-sharing will not be easily solved.
5.3 Telecommunications
5.3.1 Telecoms and News
Th e telecommunications industry has been dominated by three conglomerates: Shin Corp, DTAC, and True. 
While Shin Corp and DTAC are now outside the broadcasting sector,41 as we have seen, True’s subsidiary 
True Visions is the country’s largest subscription television company, oﬀ ering a range of domestic and foreign 
news programs such as TNN 24, TNN 2, Money Channel, CNN, BBC World, CNBC, and Bloomberg. 
As a media and telecoms conglomerate, True has adopted a ‘triple play’ marketing strategy by bundling its 
services of subscription television, mobile and ﬁ xed telephony, and broadband internet access. It also oﬀ ered 
an IPTV service for a while before terminating the service due to lukewarm market acceptance. 
40. In 2000, the company was investigated by the competition authority, but was acquitted. See 6.1.3 for more detail. 
41. Shin Corp used to own iTV, a free-to-air television station, before it was nationalized after violating certain concession conditions. Th e station 
was subsequently transformed into Th ai PBS. 
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Th e three major mobile phone companies, AIS of Shin Corp, DTAC, and True Move, oﬀ er two main services 
related to media content: SMS & MMS news, and mobile television. For SMS & MMS news, all three mobile 
phone companies make money by taking a portion of the fee paid by consumers. For mobile television, 
content providers are allowed to broadcast their content free of charge because the mobile phone operators 
already receive fees for providing wireless internet access. News services for mobile devices such as iPhone 
and iPod are also oﬀ ered by many content providers such as ASTV, the Bangkok Post, INN, and Th e Nation. 
One telecom operator, 3BB, also provides IPTV services. Most television programs distributed by 3BB’s 
IPTV services are drawn from terrestrial and satellite television broadcasts. 3BB also produces a few of its 
own programs and distributes them in a high-deﬁ nition television (HDTV) format. Th us, the availability of 
IPTV services does not necessarily increase the diversity of news, because most content is drawn from other 
platforms. However, it changes the mode of news consumption from “linear” to “non-linear”. For, rather 
than watching live programs, 3BB’s subscribers can now view television on demand. Th ey can also access 
programs broadcast within the previous seven days. 
Th e role of telecom operators in distributing media content is likely to increase after 3G mobile phone 
services start in Th ailand around late 2011. Th e broadband wireless platform will certainly enhance the 
availability of news services consumed on mobile devices. However, as in the case of IPTV, a new platform 
will not automatically increase the diversity of news without changes in market structure. 
5.3.2 Pressure of Telecoms on News Providers 
Th ailand’s mobile phone market is oligopolistic. Th is is a result of its relatively small size and the restriction 
of foreign ownership in the telecom sector by the Foreign Business Act. Th e market share of AIS, DTAC, and 
True Move is 99 percent. By contrast, content providers are numerous and small. As a result, they have very 
little power to bargain with the telecom operators. In a typical contract, the operator will restrict a provider 
from signing up with its competitors. For example, the contract between Th e Nation and AIS requires that 
audio news analysis by Suthichai Yoon, Th e Nation’s founder and a senior journalist, be supplied only to 
AIS subscribers. Even the mighty Th ai Rath newspaper is obliged to provide its entertainment news only to 
DTAC. Th is one-sided restriction, which binds content providers unilaterally, is made possible by the fact 
that mobile operators act as a gateway between content providers and consumers. 
In addition, the revenue share between a telecoms operator and a content provider in providing SMS and 
MMS news is set at 50:50 by the telecom operators. Th is share for mobile phone operators is considerably 
higher than the international standard, where telecom operators typically get 30 percent of the revenue, falling 
as low as 10 percent in a very competitive telecom market such as Japan’s. Not surprisingly, content providers 
complain about the abusive behavior of the mobile operators and claim that it hinders the development of 
quality content. 
Th e problem with True is diﬀ erent, as it is fully in the media business, having TNN 24 as its news agency. 
In this case, the complaint is that True has not been active in promoting information services supplied by 
independent content providers because it wants to promote its own content. 
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5.4 Assessments
Th e majority of spectrum is currently reserved for state agencies. Th e allocation of spectrum to private 
operators is based on a patronage concession system that does not take due account of the public interest. 
Reform attempts started after the enactment of the 1997 Constitution. Th e Broadcasting Business Act of 
2008 also provides a framework for a new regulatory regime. It is hoped that a fruitful reform will follow after 
the establishment of the long-awaited NBTC in 2011. However, the success of any such reform will depend 
on the relative strength of reform-minded media professionals and civil society vis à vis vested interests. After 
the selection of the NBTC commissioners, the next battleground is likely to be the drafting of the master plan 
for spectrum allocation and the formulation of related bylaws by the NBTC.
Without a regulator, spectrum use is in a chaotic state. White spaces in the radio frequency spectrum are 
utilized haphazardly by community radio and local commercial radio, resulting in interference and numerous 
disputes. While the NTC, the caretaking regulator for the NBTC, is trying to put things in order, the process 
is far from straightforward as it would be diﬃ  cult to take the spectrum back from those exploiting it. 
Regarding the digital dividend, there has not been much debate on how the spectrum released after the 
digital switchover should be used. Th e next battleground will be the drafting of the master plan for spectrum 
allocation, which is supposed to be ﬁ nished by mid-2012. 
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6. Digital Business
6.1 Ownership
6.1.1 Legal Developments in Media Ownership
Section 47 of the 2007 Constitution deﬁ nes frequencies used for radio, television, and telecommunication 
services as national resources that must serve the public interest. Th e accompanying transitional clause, 
Section 315, called for an organic law to restrict cross-media ownership that could limit the diversity of 
information sources. In 2008, the Broadcasting Business Act was legislated to implement this constitutional 
requirement. 
As mentioned earlier, the Act introduces three categories of broadcasting license: public, community, and 
commercial. Commercial licenses are further divided into national, regional, and local levels. In addition, the 
NBTC Act requires that at least 20 percent of the frequency spectrum should be allocated for community 
services. Th e Act also provides a funding mechanism to empower communities to make full use of the allocated 
spectrum. It is hoped that, with these legal provisions, media ownership will no longer be concentrated in 
state agencies and large media companies. Th e Broadcasting Business Act also liberalizes the satellite and 
cable television markets by granting licenses to any qualiﬁ ed applicants. It also grants interim licenses for 
low-powered community radio stations. 
In addition, Th ai PBS, the ﬁ rst national public service broadcaster, was established in 2008. Its independence 
from political and commercial inﬂ uence is guaranteed by the structure of its board of directors and direct 
ﬁ nancing from earmarked tax revenue. According to the Th ai PBS Act, a committee of representatives 
from media, governmental, and non- governmental organizations is responsible for selecting nine qualiﬁ ed 
persons: two from mass communication, three from organization management, and four from (1) democratic 
promotion, (2) community or local development, (3) learning and studying, (4) youth and family protection, 
or (5) promotion of the rights of the disadvantaged. 
As for commercial broadcasting services, Section 47 of the 2007 Constitution requires the NBTC to set 
measures to prevent mergers and acquisitions among media companies that would result in an obstruction 
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of a free ﬂ ow of information or a lack of freedom to receive information from diverse sources. To prevent 
political interference, Section 48 prohibits holders of political oﬃ  ce from owning stakes in the newspaper, 
radio, television, and telecommunication businesses. Th is new provision is intended to counter the move by 
politicians to own media companies (see section 6.1.4). If all these laws are properly enforced, it is hoped that 
media ownership will be more diversiﬁ ed and less concentrated. However, law enforcement in this area is 
likely to be tricky, as ‘proxies’ or ‘nominees’ can be employed in a way that is diﬃ  cult to detect. 
6.1.2 New Entrants in the News Market
Th e launch of Th ai PBS had a signiﬁ cant positive impact on media diversity and pluralism. Its programs have 
covered issues ignored by mainstream media, especially those related to disadvantaged people. According to 
Media Monitor, a civic media watchdog, Th ai PBS allocates 15 percent of its airtime for children’s programs, 
signiﬁ cantly higher than the average 7 percent by other state and commercial television stations.42
Th e Broadcasting Business Act of 2008 also liberalizes the market for non-terrestrial television. Th e past two 
years have witnessed market entries of many satellite and cable-based news stations such as the Nation Channel, 
Dhamma Media Channel (a religious channel), ASTV, PTV, and Voice TV. Th ousands of community radio 
stations have also been set up. Th ese new entrants help increase the diversity and pluralism of news content. 
However, without a proper regulatory regime, the liberalized market may not actually beneﬁ t society. As 
discussed earlier, many satellite-based stations are highly partisan and imbalanced. Some of them even 
provoke the use of violence in times of political conﬂ ict. Likewise, many community radios are used as 
mouthpieces for political interests and many others obviously pursue purely commercial interests by airing 
only entertainment programs to attract more advertisements. Only the minorities are genuinely operating 
for community and public purposes.
In addition to the Foreign Business Act, the foreign ownership restriction is contained in the 2007 Constitution 
and the 2008 Broadcasting Business Act. According to the Act, owners of newspapers and other mass media 
must be of Th ai nationality. For legal entities, at least 75 percent of their capital must be owned by Th ai 
nationals and at least three quarters of their directors must be Th ai. 
6.1.3 Ownership Consolidation
Horizontal mergers of media companies have been rare. Th e most recent major case happened in 1998 when 
two loss-making cable companies, IBC and UTV, merged as the United Broadcasting Corporation (UBC), 
subsequently renamed True Visions. UBC became a monopolist in the national pay-TV market. According 
to a report by a subcommittee of the Trade Competition Committee, it had increased subscription fees 
many times by moving premium programs, such as English Premier League football, from cheaper to more 
expensive packages. As a result of these price increases, the cost of subscription television became much 
42. Media Monitor, “A Survey of Terrestrial Televisions’ Schedules” (in Th ai), 2009, http://www.mediamonitor.in.th/home/ﬁ nal_report/pdf/pdf_is-
sue_34.pdf (accessed online in April 2010. 
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higher than comparable services in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Th e Trade Competition Committee 
acquitted the company of any wrongdoing, observing that the price increase was approved by MCOT, its 
concession-granting agency. 
UBC was also accused of using its dominant market power to buy exclusive rights to premium programs 
from overseas producers, preventing small and medium-sized cable operators from competing. With its 
ﬁ rmly entrenched position, UBC had no need to oﬀ er new functions such as enhanced programming (e.g., 
subtitles oﬀ ered in more than one language, or diﬀ erent camera angles), interactive services, and on-demand 
television. 
Th e monopoly status of UBC had a negative impact on news diversity since it was able to exclude certain 
content providers. For example, the Nation’s news channel was withdrawn from UBC’s packages after it 
broadcast an interview with a vocal critic of the then prime minister Th aksin Shinawatra, probably due to the 
close connection between UBC’s major shareholders and Mr. Th aksin. 
Th ere are a few recent cases of vertical integration. For example, BBTV, the operator of Channel 7, the most 
popular terrestrial television station in Th ailand, took over Media of Medias, a variety program producer, in 
2003. However, such vertical integration does not appear to have reduced pluralism and diversity of voices, 
since the merged company was not a major news program producer. 
6.1.4 Telecoms Business and the Media
Th e most signiﬁ cant business involvement of the telecom industry in the media sector happened when Shin 
Corporation, Th ailand’s largest telecommunications conglomerate, founded by Mr. Th aksin and owned by 
his family, took over iTV in June 2000.43 Th e timing of the takeover bid, before the 2001 general election, 
led to accusations that it was more politically than commercially motivated. News staﬀ  protested against 
the takeover and 23 of them, known as the ‘iTV rebels’, were subsequently sacked. During the election 
campaign, the iTV news agenda was controlled by a new executive team. It was widely criticized for acting 
as a mouthpiece for Mr. Th aksin. 
While he was still prime minister, Mr. Th aksin and his family sold Shin Corp. to Temasek Holdings of 
Singapore in 2006, potentially violating a law which prohibits foreigners from owning media in Th ailand. 
Later, iTV’s concession was revoked after the Th aksin administration lost power because the company violated 
some concession conditions. Subsequently, the government took over the station and renamed it TiTV. TiTV 
was ﬁ nally transformed into Th ai PBS in January 2008. 
43. Previous major shareholders in iTV include Siam Commercial Bank and the Nation Multimedia Group. Designed to be an independent news 
station after the May 1992 political crisis, no shareholder was allowed to own more than 10 percent of the company. After the 1997 ﬁ nancial 
crisis, this restriction was lifted, opening the way for Shin Corporation to become the major shareholder.
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Another signiﬁ cant case of telecom involvement is provided by True Corporation. As the border line between 
telecom and media businesses has become increasingly blurred, True Corporation has pursued a convergence 
strategy under the motto of “True Convergence”. True Corporation now owns True Move (mobile telephony), 
True Online (hi-speed internet), True Visions (subscription TV), True Life (content), and True Money (money 
and electronic transaction services). True Visions produces most of its local content in-house for broadcast on 
True Inside (entertainment news channel), True Music (music channel), and TNN 24 News (24-hour news 
and commentary channel). Unlike AIS and DTAC’s, True Move’s SMS service supplies only in-house news. 
Its popular reality show, “Academy Fantasia”, is only open to True Move subscribers. Boosted partly by the 
show’s success, True Move’s subscribers soared to 1.4 million after the end of the program’s third season. True 
Corporation also adopts a ‘triple play’ strategy by bundling its oﬀ er of Pay-TV, mobile and ﬁ xed telephony, 
and broadband internet services into one package. All these strategies may be good for True’s shareholders, 
but can have the eﬀ ect of creating unfair competition in the media and telecom market.
6.1.5 Transparency of Media Ownership
Th e Constitution requires all broadcasters to be of Th ai nationality. It also prohibits holders of political oﬃ  ce 
from owning shares in media companies. In addition, the Broadcasting Business Act requires at least one-
third of the shares in a local commercial broadcaster to be owned by people living in the locality. 
As a result, it is necessary to have a system requiring media operators to report ownership information 
to the authorities. In practice, applicants for a broadcasting license must submit a copy of their business 
registration certiﬁ cate, issued by the Department of Business Development (DBD), to the NBTC. Th is 
certiﬁ cate contains information about shareholders, the board of directors, and management. Due to its 
limited resources, however, the DBD rarely veriﬁ es the accuracy of this information. Companies are only 
investigated when there are allegations of legal violations.
In the case of telecommunications services, the NTC lists all licensees on its website. However, details of 
shareholders and the board of directors are not publicly provided. It is expected that information on broadcasting 
licensees will follow the same pattern. As a result, in order to obtain information on media ownership and 
control, one has to search the website of the DBD or use Business Online, a commercial service. In short, 
obtaining information about ownership requires eﬀ ort and, in some cases, a certain amount of money. 
6.2 Media Funding
6.2.1 Public and Private Funding 
Public funding for media has increased signiﬁ cantly over the past few years due to several important events. 
Firstly, since Th ai PBS started operations early in 2008, it has been ﬁ nanced by a 1.5 percent earmarked tax 
on alcohol and tobacco, with a current ceiling of THB 2 billion per year. Th e ceiling is subject to upward 
revision every three years by the Minister of Finance. Th is unique funding model is intended to ensure Th ai 
PBS’s political independence. Second, the Th ai Health Promotion Foundation started a Media Project for 
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Children and Family to provide ﬁ nancial support for production of children and family radio programs, 
children’s books, and activities related to media literacy. 
Finally, the NBTC Act will also provide a mechanism for mobilizing additional ﬁ nancial resources. In particular, 
the Act will establish a fund for subsidizing community broadcasting, developing communication resources, 
producing programs for children and families, media research, developing a broadcasters’ code of ethics, and 
protecting media consumers. Revenue for the fund will come from license fees of broadcasters and the auction 
revenue of commercial licenses. Among these sources, the ﬁ rst is likely to be the largest and the most stable. 
Th ere is also international funding for media development activities, such as organizing public seminars, 
publishing books, or funding alternative media. Major donors include the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), UNESCO, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation (HBF), the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA), the European Union (EU), the Open 
Society Foundations (OSF), and embassies of Western countries. For example, the Deepsouthwatch project 
(see section 4.3) is supported by the EU, the U.S. Embassy, and the Dutch Embassy. A little domestic funding 
from charitable organizations is also available; the latest example is the Somchai Neelaphaijit Foundation, 
which provides grants for investigative journalism related to human rights issues. 
Spurred by the growing interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR), a few private ﬁ rms, such as the Siam 
Cement Group, also provide grants to support civic activities including those related to media development. 
However, it is unclear how sustainable this funding will be, as grants from the private sector are generally 
awarded on a project basis and must be reconsidered every year. 
While Th ailand has a tradition of philanthropy, most donations go to support religious activities. Endowed 
with such donations, many religious organizations can own and operate traditional and new media. For 
example, the Dhamma Media Channel is subsidized by the Dhammakaya temple, which has a powerful fund-
raising machine. With no culture of donation speciﬁ cally for civic activities and media development, not-for-
proﬁ t media organizations cannot rely on individual or corporate donors. ASTV and PTV are exceptions to 
this rule: they both receive donations from their supporters. 
To sum up, public funding is likely to increase following the adoption of the NBTC Act. In the longer run, 
however, funding may stagnate or even decline in real terms, if the subsidy ceiling of Th ai PBS, the largest 
funding source for non-commercial media activities, is not adjusted upward to keep pace with inﬂ ation. 
Private funding for non-commercial media is currently limited to religious outlets. 
6.2.2 Other Sources of Funding
As in other countries, media companies receive additional income from providing services on new media 
platforms. In addition to the traditional ‘ﬁ rst screen’ (television screen or newspaper), some also generate 
income from the ‘second screen’ (computer) by selling online advertisements in the form of classiﬁ ed ads, 
banner ads, and in-text ads based on a cost-per-click model. Advertising spending on the internet has risen 
steeply, with a growth rate of 30 percent in 2009, albeit from a very low base. As the internet is a transnational 
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platform, the market for online advertising is potentially global. In other words, media and advertising 
companies can now target audiences anywhere in the world. However, advertising that targets Th ais overseas 
is still very rare. Th e subscription model, based on conditional access, is used even less frequently as media 
companies believe that the gain in subscription fee is likely to be outweighed by the loss in advertising 
revenue. Catering to the ‘third screen’ (mobile device) is seen by many media companies as more viable; this 
is shown by the rush to provide SMS and MMS news services. 
With the ownership of various outlets, media companies are now in a position to oﬀ er integrated advertising 
packages to advertisers. In fact, many newspapers have already oﬀ ered an advertising package of print and 
online commercials. 
As audiences are now segmented by platform, media companies can target advertisements with much greater 
accuracy. For example, as the audience of the Nation Channel’s 24-hour news is mostly the educated middle 
classes, ﬁ nancial products that require some ﬁ nancial literacy can be directed to them. In addition, targeting 
can be based on geographical location. While advertisers targeting national consumers can advertise on 
satellite television, those targeting consumers in speciﬁ c geographical areas can advertise on cable television 
and local radio stations. Th e ability of cable and satellite television to air advertisements, which is made 
possible for the ﬁ rst time by the Broadcasting Business Act, is expected to facilitate market entry for new 
media companies and potentially increase media diversity and pluralism over the longer term. 
6.3 Media Business Models
6.3.1 Changes in Media Business Models 
Traditionally, the media industries have relied on two main business models. Th e ﬁ rst is selling advertising, or 
equivalently selling audiences to advertisers. Th e second is selling content through subscription. For free-to-
air television and radio, the dominant model is the ﬁ rst. For newspapers and pay-TV, the dominant model is 
the combination of the two, with more weight on the ﬁ rst. 
As in other countries, media companies, especially radio stations and newspapers, are facing low growth 
in advertising revenue, if not an absolute decline. According to AGB Nielsen Media Research, the overall 
advertising spend on radio in Bangkok decreased from about THB 7.9 billion in 2008 to THB 6.9 billion in 
2009. By contrast, revenue from online advertising is on the rise (though still very small as a share of total ad 
spend: see section 1.3.3). As a result, media companies that are able successfully to shift to online media will 
be able to grasp the opportunities. For example, the Nation Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), the new media 
subsidiary of the Nation Multimedia Group, saw its revenue grow by 30 percent last year. On the other hand, 
its sister newspapers, Th e Nation, Krungthep Turakij, and Kom Chum Luek, are all suﬀ ering a decline in revenue. 
Th e new media also change the business models of advertisers. Most importantly, the proliferation of digital 
platforms makes the scarcity of distribution channels a thing of the past. In addition to traditional media, 
they can now choose to advertise on websites, social networks and satellite television. For example, Unilever 
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Th ailand has allocated some of its advertising budget to satellite and local cable television, hoping to target its 
consumers with greater accuracy. Th e new media also challenge the role of media companies as middlemen 
for content selection and distribution. Using the new media, some advertisers are trying to bypass media 
companies altogether. For instance, Land & House, a leading real estate company specializing in high-end 
housing, now spends hardly any of its advertising budget on traditional media. Instead, it uses the new media 
for direct marketing activities by experimenting with a number of techniques, including viral marketing. 
With advertising revenue from traditional media in decline, media companies are struggling to build new 
business models around the new media. In short, they are trying to follow the money that is migrating 
from the ﬁ rst screen to the second and third screens. However, the business models for the second and the 
third screens are quite diﬀ erent. As mobile subscribers are used to paying for content and services, media 
companies expect the third screen to be a new cash cow. Th is is to be contrasted with the remote prospect 
of earning non-advertising revenue from the second screen as internet users are used to free online content. 
On the other hand, it appears easier to advertise on the second than on the third screen. While the business 
models for new media are far from being settled, media companies cannot aﬀ ord to be left behind. Many of 
them are rushing to the new platforms, apparently in the belief that a multi-platform business will strengthen 
their position in the advertising market. 
Media companies that cannot formulate a new media business model may resort to strategies that conﬂ ict 
with the principles of good journalism. During the economic slump, it has become increasingly acceptable 
for media companies to sell advertising in the form of “advertorials”, which blur the line between editorial 
content and advertising. Other companies provide “below-the-line” advertising services, such as organizing 
events. Th is can potentially compromise their integrity as reputable media companies. As discussed in section 
4.1.2, the Matichon Group was heavily criticized for accepting a commissioned work from the Ministry of 
ICT to organize an event and gave full coverage of the event in its newspapers despite the fact that much of 
the content was not newsworthy. 
It is vital for media companies to assess whether they can use technological convergence as a growth or 
cost-cutting strategy. Our interviews with executives suggest that most Th ai media companies take the latter 
view. However, undue cost-cutting can have a negative impact on output, especially if it means hiring fewer 
qualiﬁ ed journalists. Insuﬃ  cient manpower leads inevitably to a reduction in investigative and original news 
content, making the media companies increasingly indistinguishable from their online counterparts. 
6.4 Assessments 
Th e new media such as satellite and cable television as well as internet-based radio and television are expected 
to de-monopolize the broadcasting market, which has traditionally been dominated by a few terrestrial 
television stations. In terms of audience share, these stations are still the most inﬂ uential news sources. 
Th e problem is that their operations are almost entirely dictated by commercial and political interests. For 
example, the National Broadcasting Service of Th ailand (NBT) has always been a propaganda tool for the 
government. 
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Th e rise of new media, such as ASTV, PTV, and Prachatai, has signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected the way political discourse 
is framed. Closely related to the parties involved in the current troubles, ASTV and PTV often frame the 
conﬂ icts in a highly confrontational and divisive way. Th ey repeatedly attack moderate voices that propose 
peaceful negotiations to end the political conﬂ icts and eﬀ ectively silence many of them. ASTV also tends 
to stir up nationalism whenever border disputes between Th ailand and Cambodia erupt, making it more 
diﬃ  cult to discuss the case in a rational way. 
 
Th anks to the new media, news providers are able to present alternative views that the government cannot 
easily censor. Th e case of the Nation Channel, which was taken oﬀ  the air by UBC and subsequently 
moved to the satellite platform, exempliﬁ es the increasing independence of media from political censorship. 
Likewise, when the political talk show Muangthai Raisabdah (Th ailand Weekly) was cancelled by MCOT, it 
was quickly reborn on satellite television. Also, after the pro-Th aksin talk show “Truth Today” was removed 
from NBT, following Mr. Th aksin’s overthrow in the 2006 coup, it was relocated to D-Station, though it was 
subsequently shut down by the Emergency Decree in April 2009. Th e station was later reborn as People TV 
(PTV) and became even more provocative during the redshirt movement in 2010. 
Even though the media can evade government censorship, they cannot escape ﬁ nancial reality. Due to the 
shifting revenue base, they have to struggle harder to survive ﬁ nancially. Many of them have to compromise 
their professional integrity for commercial reasons. For example, the Bangkok Post and Post Today often print 
‘news’ and pictures about Central Department Stores, which belong to its major shareholders. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions can present another threat to ﬁ nancially weak media companies. Grammy, one 
of the largest entertainment companies, tried to take over Matichon and the Bangkok Post and two other 
daily newspapers in 2005. A public outcry led Grammy to abandon the attempt. Cross-ownership between 
media and telecom companies can also result in tied sales that potentially limit choice for consumers and 
independent program producers, if the media-telecom conglomerate has signiﬁ cant power in some markets. 
Some media organizations employ new business models to survive competition in the age of convergence. 
Th e ﬁ rst involves the expansion of delivery channels to new media to reap the beneﬁ ts from economies 
of scale  by selling the same services on multiple platforms. For instance, the Nation Multimedia Group 
distributes its news for newspapers, radio, satellite television, mobile television, SMS, websites, blogs, and 
social media. Owning many delivery platforms also allows it to oﬀ er integrated services to advertisers. While 
some platforms, such as mobile television and social media, are not proﬁ table by themselves, they help attract 
audiences to other proﬁ table platforms. While the Nation Multimedia Group as a whole is still loss-making, 
Nation Broadcasting Corporation, its new media subsidiary, announced that its proﬁ t for the third quarter 
of 2010 was THB 28.3 million, a 19 percent increase over the previous year.44
44. See http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/home/detail/ﬁ nance/ﬁ nance/20101109/361646/news.html?utm_content=backtype-tweetcount&utm_
medium=bt.io-twitter&utm_source=direct-bt.io (accessed in November 2010).
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Another viable business model is to invest little and expect moderate returns. As the new media allow cheap 
production and delivery of news, media companies can be proﬁ table even in intensely competitive markets. 
Satellite television provides a good case study. While the advertising tariﬀ  of a satellite television station is 
much lower than that of a terrestrial one, many satellite stations are proﬁ table because the monthly operating 
costs can be as little as THB 3 million (US$100,000). 
In sum, the rise of new media has changed not only the way political discourse is framed but also the business 
models of the media company themselves. Th ese two points are closely interrelated. 
In terms of framing political discourse, the clearest and most worrying trend is that new media are used as 
propaganda machines during political conﬂ icts. While this phenomenon partly reﬂ ects the current political 
environment, it also demonstrates that new media can be used in a way that deeply divides society. 
A brief analysis of the diﬀ erences in business models of the mainstream and new media may shed light on 
this phenomenon. Traditional media generally rely on advertising revenue. As a result, they cannot be too 
extreme in their political orientation, for fear of alienating some of the audience. On the contrary, new media 
tend to incur much lower cost and can be ﬁ nanced in many ways, e.g. advertising, subscriptions, donations, 
or even sponsorship by political groups. As they usually target speciﬁ c segments of the audience, they can 
express more extreme political orientations. At worst, they can be used to frame political discourse in a very 
destructive way by deepening political conﬂ icts and inciting violence, as shown in the Th ai case in 2010. 
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7. Policies, Laws and Regulators
7.1 Policies and Laws
7.1.1 Digital Switch-over of Terrestrial Transmission
7.1.1.1 Access and Aﬀ ordability 
Th e NBTC Act requires the NBTC to draft a frequency allocation master plan within one year of its 
appointment. Since the NBTC Act was announced in the Royal Gazette in December 2010, the appointment 
of the commission should be ﬁ nished by mid-2011 and the master plan drafted by mid-2012. Th e plan will 
provide a framework for spectrum reallocation and utilization for broadcasting and telecommunications. Th e 
Act also sets aside 20 percent of spectrum speciﬁ cally for community uses. Another important element is a 
plan for digital terrestrial broadcasting. 
While spectrum reallocation for radio services is relatively straightforward as the term of most concessions 
is only one to two years, spectrum reallocation for television services is much more diﬃ  cult. Th is is because 
television concessions have much longer terms. For example, the concessions for Channel 3 and Channel 7 
will end in 2020 and 2022, respectively. As the Constitution provides protection to concessions until the end 
of their terms, spectrum for television services may not be reallocated for another decade. 
7.1.1.2 Subsidies for Equipment 
Th ere are currently no oﬃ  cial policies about helping certain audience groups to prepare for analog switch oﬀ . 
According to the NECTEC study, which assumes digital switch-on in 2011, two factors need to be considered 
before analog broadcasting is switched oﬀ : the adoption rate of digital television reception, and the length 
of the simulcast period. Th e study proposes that analog switch-oﬀ  should occur only after 90 percent of 
households have digital receivers or set-top boxes. NECTEC believes this is most likely to happen around 
2015 (the medium-case scenario in Table 24). NECTEC also encourages the government to subsidize the 
purchase of set-top boxes and estimates the cost at about THB 641 million at 2011 constant prices.
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Table 24.
Net beneﬁ ts and governmental subsidies in three DTV adoption scenarios
DTV Adoption 
Rate
Net Beneﬁ t* 
(THB million)
Households 
not having DTV receiver in 2015 (%)
Governmental STB Subsidies 
in 2015* (THB million)
Fast 30,467 5% 321
Medium 28,924 10% 641
Slow 26,936 35% 2,244
Note: * Numbers are at 2011 constant prices. Net beneﬁ ts are the estimated total beneﬁ ts minus the estimated total costs related 
to digital switchover. Th e former are the sum of the value of the spectrum released and the cost savings due to digital trans-
mission. Th e latter are the sum of private investment cost, equipment costs paid by consumers, and government subsidy.
Source: NECTEC.
7.1.1.3 Legal Provisions on Public Interest
As the master plan requires reallocation of the frequency spectrum, it would inevitably generate winners 
and losers. As a result, the process of drafting the master plan is likely to be highly political. Foreseeing the 
problem, the NBTC Act requires the NBTC to conduct public hearings with all stakeholders before drafting 
the plan. Th e Act also accords the master plan the status of a regulation, thus allowing stakeholders to ﬁ le 
lawsuits at the Administrative Court in case there are irregularities in the process. Although designed with 
the intention of protecting the public interest, this provision could open a door for vested interests to ﬁ le 
frivolous lawsuits. If cases drag on, as many previous cases in the Administrative Court have done, the status 
quo would be extended for a few more years. 
7.1.1.4 Public Consultation
Th e NBTC Act requires the NBTC to consult all interested parties when drafting the switch-over plan. 
7.1.2 The Internet
7.1.2.1 Regulation of News on the Internet
Media content regulation in Th ailand is mostly technology-neutral in that it does not discriminate with 
regard to content on the grounds of delivery platform. For example, the Criminal Code, which contains 
provisions on defamation and lèse majesté, is independent of the platforms on which the alleged content 
appears. Th us, the internet and mobile platforms are generally treated the same way as traditional media, e.g. 
newspapers. 
Th e exception to this general rule is the Computer-Related Crime Act of 2007, which contains some 
provisions related to certain online content. For example, the author or poster of online content is liable to 
incarceration or ﬁ ne as stipulated in Section 14 of the Act:
Whoever commits the following acts shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ﬁ ve years or to 
a ﬁ ne not exceeding THB 100,000 or both:
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1. Inputting into a computer system wholly or partially fake or false computer data that is likely to cause 
damage to another person or the public;
2. Inputting into a computer system false computer data in a manner that is likely to undermine national 
security or to cause public panic;
3. Inputting into a computer system computer data that is an oﬀ ence against national security or is of a 
terrorist nature according to the Criminal Code;
4. Inputting into a computer system pornographic computer data that is accessible to the public;
5. Publishing or forwarding any computer data with the full knowledge that such computer data falls under 
paragraph (1), (2), (3) or (4)
Loosely speaking, the provisions in Section 14 (1)–(4) are similar to their paper-based counterparts. Section 
14 (5) also extends legal liabilities to those who help disseminate the contents that violate Section 14 (1)–(4).
Online pornography is speciﬁ cally prohibited by the Act, which also provides sanctions against photo 
doctoring that is likely to impair the reputation of others. In addition to the aforementioned substantive 
provisions, the Act also contains clauses on procedural matters, such as the requirement imposed on providers 
to store traﬃ  c data for at least 90 days. 
In sum, communications on the internet and mobile platforms are generally regulated in the same way as 
other media platforms. However, there are circumstances in which they are regulated more strictly than those 
on traditional media platforms.
7.1.2.2 Legal Liability for Internet Content
Under the Computer-Related Crime Act, legal liability for internet content rests with authors, posters, 
webmasters of the site or webboard, and bloggers. In addition, any service providers who intentionally 
consent to oﬀ ences prohibited by the Act are also liable to the same penalty as the primary violators. Service 
providers are deﬁ ned broadly by the Act to include (1) a person who provides other persons with access to 
the internet or the ability to communicate by other means through a computer system, and (2) a person who 
stores computer data for the beneﬁ t of other persons. In other words, internet service providers (ISPs), web 
hosting service providers, webboard managers and so forth are all classiﬁ ed as service providers. 
Th e Act has signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected the operation of new media service providers due to the new legal risks 
imposed on them. Interestingly, the greatest type of risk does not come from news or articles produced by 
these providers. Rather it comes from user-generated content such as comments posted on their webboards. 
Th e case of Prachatai, a popular political website, illustrates the risks introduced by the Act. Another case was 
that of Suvicha Th akor, a blogger who posted a message that was insulting to the King and was convicted 
under the Act to a 20-year prison term in August 2009. He applied for and received royal clemency in June 
2010. 
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The perils of being a web manager: the case of Chiranuch
Before the passage of the Computer-Related Crime Act, Prachatai’s web manager, Chiranuch 
Premchaiporn, was able to use her discretion when accepting or refusing a request from the authorities 
to delete certain messages posted on Prachatai’s webboard. Since the Act became law, however, she 
has had to accept every such request. This is because maintaining an open space to promote free 
expression has become a very risky business. To reduce the risks, webmasters need to relentlessly 
monitor and carefully moderate their webboards to erase sensitive content and comply with the 
requests for data from the authorities. 
During the last few years, Chiranuch has been asked to be a witness in many cases related to the 
comments posted on Prachatai webboard for many law enforcement agencies, including the Ministry 
of ICT, the Crime Suppression Division, the Metropolitan Police Bureau, the Central Investigation 
Bureau, the Technological Crime Unit, and a police station in a north-eastern province of Thailand. 
In January 2009, the Crime Suppression Division sent a summons to the Prachatai editor to testify 
as a witness in a lèse majesté case related to a comment posted on its webboard. The police also 
interrogated directors and ex-directors of the Media Education for Community Foundation, the parent 
organization of Prachatai. 
In March 2009, police ofﬁ cers from the Crime Suppression Division arrested Chiranuch, charging her 
with violating Sections 14 (2), 14 (3), 14 (5), and 15 of the Computer-Related Crime Act. Again, the case 
involves a charge related to lèse majesté comments posted on Prachatai’s webboard. Her computer’s 
hard disk was copied for evidentiary purposes. Although Chiranuch was released on bail the same day, 
she was soon notiﬁ ed of nine additional charges, because the police separated nine infringing posts 
into nine separate cases. In May, the prosecutor ﬁ led a lawsuit against her. If convicted, Chiranuch 
could be imprisoned for up to 50 years. In September 2010, Chiranuch was arrested at Suvarnabhumi 
Airport after returning from a conference on internet freedom in Budapest. She was then escorted to 
Khon Kaen provincial police station where the charges were ﬁ led.
Various organizations, including Freedom against Censorship Thailand and the Thai Netizen Network, 
called on the government to drop all charges against her. In an editorial, The Nation strongly criticized 
the conservative ofﬁ cials for not understanding the nature of the new media and called the day 
Chiranuch was prosecuted “A Dark Day for Thai Freedom of Expression”.
Source: Newspaper reports.
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7.2 Regulators
7.2.1 Changes in Content Regulation
Over the past ﬁ ve years, content regulation in traditional as well as new media has changed in several 
important respects. For television and radio, the Broadcasting Business Act contains a number of provisions 
on the regulation of broadcasting programs:
 Licensees shall prepare programming schedules in conformity with their license types and submit the 
schedule to the NBTC 15 days before commencing operations. In particular, they have to broadcast news 
programs for no less than 70 percent of the total airtime in the case of public or community services, 
and 25 percent in the case of commercial services. Programs for community services must also beneﬁ t 
local communities. In addition, the NBTC may set watersheds in the broadcasting schedule to protect 
children and young people.
 Th e NBTC can require television and radio operators to provide services that facilitate the reception of 
programs by the disabled and the disadvantaged. 
 Licensees shall not broadcast programs that undermine the democratic regime, national security, public 
peace and morals, or air pornographic or obscene contents, or programs that cause severe degradation of 
people’s mental and physical health.
However, the NBTC, speciﬁ ed as the regulator in these provisions, does not yet exist, which means these 
regulations have not been and cannot currently be enforced.
Initiated by the Public Relations Department, a content rating system for terrestrial television programs was 
ﬁ rst introduced by a cabinet resolution in June 2007. Under the system, television programs are classiﬁ ed 
into ﬁ ve categories: 
1. programs for pre-school children (3–5 years old)
2. programs for children (6–12 years old)
3. programs for a general audience
4. programs that need parental guidance for minors’ viewing
5. programs inappropriate for children and youth. 
Programs in the fourth and ﬁ fth categories can be broadcast only after 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. respectively. 
Unlike that of the NBTC, this rating system has no legal force. Accordingly, even if there are overt violations, 
the oﬃ  cials in charge can only seek ‘cooperation’ from the broadcasters. 
Th e Computer-Related Crime Act created a content-regulation regime speciﬁ cally for the new media. In 
addition to the requirements discussed in section 7.1.2, the Act grants power to the competent authorities to:
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1. notify or summon any person involved in any oﬀ ence deﬁ ned by the Act to give statements or submit 
evidence
2. require traﬃ  c data from service providers
3. require service providers to submit users’ information in their possession or control
4. copy data and traﬃ  c-related data from computer systems suspected of having been used in committing 
the oﬀ ences
5. require the owner of the computer data or storage devices to deliver such computer data or devices
6. access computer systems or traﬃ  c data of any person in order to identify the oﬀ ender; decrypt computer 
data 
7. seize computer systems for the purpose of identifying details of the oﬀ ence or the oﬀ ender. 
7.2.2 Regulatory Independence
Th e NBTC is required by the Constitution to be an independent regulator, which is generally interpreted 
as meaning independent of political interference. Th is requirement is implemented by the NBTC Act in a 
number of ways. 
 First, while the NBTC has to perform its duties pursuant to the government’s policies, it has full autonomy 
in conducting its day-to-day operations. 
 Second, political oﬃ  ce holders are barred from becoming NBTC commissioners. 
 Th ird, professional associations, academia, and civic groups are responsible for shortlisting the candidates. 
Th e Senate (upper house of parliament) then selects the commissioners from the proposed list. Th e 
process leaves very little room for government intervention, except in the case of deadlock. If the Senate 
fails to select all the required commissioners from the shortlist within 60 days, the Cabinet selects the 
remaining commissioners from the list. 
 Fourth, the ﬁ xed term of six years is meant to ensure the NBTC’s stability and independence. Individual 
members as well as the whole NBTC can be impeached by a qualiﬁ ed majority vote of no conﬁ dence in 
the Senate, in the event of corruption or ineﬀ ectiveness. 
 Finally, the NBTC is ﬁ nancially independent since most of its funding comes from the license fee. It also 
has full autonomy over the recruitment, personnel and ﬁ nancial management of the NBTC Oﬃ  ce. 
Th e NBTC is obliged and empowered by law to be an independent regulator, and is accountable to the 
Senate. Th us, the source of concern is not how the government will interfere but how the Senate will select 
and supervise the NBTC. Comprising 150 members, half of them unelected, the Senate has not always 
had an impressive record in selecting and supervising independent bodies. For example, its selection of the 
Human Rights Commissioners was widely criticized by human rights groups as involving favoritism. 
M A P P I N G  D I G I T A L  M E D I A     T H A I L A N D7 0
7.2.3 Digital Licensing
Under the Broadcasting Business Act, cable and satellite operators are entitled to broadcasting licenses 
provided they meet basic conditions such as being Th ai legal entities and having adequate capital to operate. 
As a result, there are few concerns about the fairness and transparency of the licensing process. However, 
there are some concerns related to the licensing of digital terrestrial television. Without an oﬃ  cial plan 
for digitization, it is unclear how the digital dividend will be distributed. Issues that need to be resolved 
include the following: does the released spectrum continue to be owned by the incumbent television stations 
currently using them, or are they to be reallocated, and—if the latter—to which services, and how? While the 
Broadcasting Business Act allows the NBTC to reduce or even waive license fees for public and community 
broadcasters, it leaves wide discretion to the NBTC to deﬁ ne what constitutes the “public interest”. Th is is 
an issue for future attention.
7.2.4 Role of Self-regulatory Mechanisms
Th e National Press Council of Th ailand (NPCT) was established in 1997 as the self-regulatory body of the 
print media. It currently has 50 organizational members. Its aim is to raise professional standards without 
relying on government intervention. It regulates its members by drafting a series of codes of ethics and 
considering complaints related to alleged violations of these codes by members. Content carried on new 
media receives the same treatment as that in print media. 
Modeled on the NPCT, the News Broadcasting Council of Th ailand (NBCT) was set up in late 2009 as a 
self-regulatory body of television and radio news organizations. Th e establishment was partly encouraged 
by Section 46 of the 2007 Constitution and the Broadcasting Business Act. It now has 11 organizational 
members, most of which are major television and radio stations. Th ere is an ongoing debate about whether 
to open membership to cable and satellite television operators. Community radios are also excluded due to 
their operational diﬀ erences from public and commercial media.
In addition to being regulated by professional bodies, some media organizations, such as Th ai PBS, Th e 
Nation, and the Bangkok Post, have internal codes of ethics. Th ai PBS has issued a code of ethics for its 
board of directors, management, and staﬀ , as well as standards for media production and distribution and 
guidelines for professional ethics. Bangkok Post journalists must also pledge to comply with the codes of ethics 
when signing their employment contracts. However, the Nation and the Bangkok Post both use their codes of 
ethics as guidelines for internal use with no established mechanisms to process complaints from the public. 
Only Th ai PBS has set up a committee to consider complaints from the public.
7.3 Government Interference
7.3.1 The Market
Almost every government has tried to interfere with the media, diﬀ ering only in degree. While direct control 
of state media and censorship of private media used to be the main intervention mechanisms, ﬁ nancial 
intervention has recently emerged as a new instrument. In 2009, the government’s advertising spend on 
7 1O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 1
television reached THB 2.77 billion (US$85.5 million) or about 5.3 percent of the total advertising spend 
on television. In a single month, January 2010, the government spent THB 74 million (US$2.28 million) on 
newspaper advertisements, making it one of the top ﬁ ve buyers. Government spending on radio advertising 
during the same period was even more pronounced as it was the biggest spender, with a budget of THB 64 
million (US$1.97 million). With the power of money, a government can exercise considerable control over 
the media market. It should not be a surprise that media companies friendly to the government are often 
rewarded with large advertising revenue. By the same token, those who challenge the government risk losing 
such rewards. In 2002, an executive of Naew Na, a Th ai-language daily, told a Senate committee that Th aksin, 
then the prime minister, had asked the newspaper to drop the column of a government critic. Th e newspaper 
refused, and as a result, lost advertising revenue from state-owned enterprises. Th e Th ai Post experienced 
similar pressures.45 
Political interference with the media becomes even more harmful when political power merges with big 
business. During the premiership of Th aksin Shinawatra, intervention in the media was especially heavy 
handed. Cooperative outlets were allegedly rewarded with handsome advertising contracts from the 
government, his family-owned empire and his political allies’ businesses.46 In addition to advertising money, 
the government can also reward friendly media with some privileges. For example, the Manager Media 
Group, during its honeymoon with the Th aksin government, got a contract from the MCOT to run a prime 
time television talk show Muangthai Raisabdah (Th ailand Weekly). Th e group’s debt to the state-owned 
Krung Th ai Bank was also reduced from THB 1.8 billion to THB 200 million.47
7.3.2 The Regulator
While cooperative media are rewarded by the government, others face harassment. Th e Th aksin administration 
became notorious in this respect. From his ﬁ rst days in oﬃ  ce, Mr. Th aksin resorted to all kinds of stratagems 
with the media. With former journalists and activists as advisers, he knew how to manage and disarm the 
media. Th e mode of interference with each outlet depended on its organizational and ﬁ nancial vulnerability. 
As a start, critical television and radio operators saw their contracts terminated by state agencies and granted 
instead to those friendly to the government.
Dealing with the press required diﬀ erent strategies from those used to control the broadcasting media. 
Th is is because, unlike the broadcasting media, the press had enjoyed independence for many decades. A 
combination of techniques was employed, ranging from verbal intimidation to harassment by a number of 
state authorities. Most blatantly, the Anti-Money Laundering Oﬃ  ce (AMLO), a quasi-independent body 
set up to ﬁ ght money laundering by drug dealers and organized crime, was used to investigate the assets of 
media professionals, social activists and their families. Among those in the investigation list are editors and 
senior journalists of the Nation Multimedia Group and the Th ai Post. Likewise, the Revenue Department was 
reportedly used to investigate tax records of critical outlets such as the Th ai Post. 
45. Th e Nation, 1 December 2005.
46. Interview with Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Th ai Press Under Seige,” Th e Irrawaddy, 1 March 2004.
47. Th e Nation, 30 November 2005.
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Under the current Abhisit administration, the climate of censorship against red-shirt media has also spread 
under the state of emergency decree declared on 7 April 2010. Accused of spreading misinformation, 
community radio stations sympathetic to the red-shirt movements were raided and closed down, and 
the transmissions of satellite-based People Channel (PTV), the major mouthpiece of the red-shirts, were 
suspended by Th aicom, a satellite operator, under the order of Ministry of ICT. Red-shirt print media, Voice 
of Th aksin, Red News and Truth Today, were also banned. Th e situation seems to be worse on the internet. A 
report by Sawatree Suksri ﬁ nds 74,686 URLs blocked by the MICT.48 Reporters Without Borders claims that 
not only overt redshirts supporters such as Norportchor USA (www.norporchorusa.com) and UDD Th ailand 
(www.uddthailand.com)  but also news sources such as Th ai E-News (thaienews.blogspot.com), Th ai Free 
News (www.thaifreenews2.com), and Prachatai (www.prachatai.com) were blocked under the Emergency 
Decree. 49
7.3.3 Other Forms of Interference
Intimidation by criminal and civil defamation lawsuits was also used by Mr. Th aksin and his business empire. 
High-proﬁ le cases include the lawsuit ﬁ led in 2003 by the Shin Corporation, a telecoms conglomerate owned 
by Mr. Th aksin’s family, against the Th ai Post and Supinya Klangnarong, a media activist, demanding US$10 
million.
Intervention in the media continued after Mr. Th aksin’s government. During the political clashes of 2010, 
for example, the Abhisit administration employed the Emergency Decree to close down the red-shirts’ PTV, 
a large number of community radios, and thousands of websites. As a result, websites which supported or 
leaned towards the red-shirt movements were blocked by the order of the Center for the Resolution of the 
Emergency Situation (CRES) and the Ministry of ICT. Examples of such websites are Norporchorusa.com, 
Prachatai.com, Sameskybooks.org, and Weareallhuman.net. Mr. Th aksin’s twitter account, Twitter.com/
thaksinlive, was also blocked. While the enforcement of an Emergency Decree to silence the media may in 
most cases be lawful, its legitimacy is highly doubtful.
Other forms of pressure are also exerted against critical media. First, access to exclusive information may 
be withheld. As a senior journalist, Suthichai Yoon, noted in 2005: “Th e insiders had access to exclusive 
information ... Th e outsiders got caught in a web of constant intimidation, both in public and behind 
the scenes”.50 Th is is still the case today. In some cases, pressure is applied directly against editors and the 
newsroom staﬀ . For example, after the Kom Chad Luek newspaper reported on the misdemeanours of Mr. 
Th aksin’s son, its editor, Th epchai Yong, was pressured to resign. 
48. http://ilaw.or.th/node/632, accessed in January, 2011.
49. http://en.rsf.org/thailand-does-state-of-emergency-justify-29-07-2010,38055.html, accessed in January 2011.
50. Suthichai Yoon, “Th aksin breeds ‘suicide-bomb’ journalism”, Th e Nation, 1 December 2005.
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7.4 Assessments
Due to the delay in establishing the NBCT, the sector regulator, Th ailand has not been able to formulate a 
policy for the digitization of terrestrial television. As a result, there is no plan related to (1) the preparation 
phase before digital switch-on; (2) the transition phase during which both analog and digital signals are 
broadcast simultaneously; and (3) the phase after full analog switch-oﬀ . Th ere is only a broad provision in the 
NBCT Act that requires the NBCT to formulate such a plan within one year after it is appointed. Th e studies 
by the NECTEC and the NTC provide some policy directions, but they are not binding.
Direct control of state media and censorship of private media used to be the government’s main instruments 
for intervening in the media market. Th ey are used by the current government under the Emergency Decree. 
However, such instruments are becoming increasingly ineﬀ ective and unacceptable as the media market is 
liberalized and Th ai democracy becomes more consolidated. Financial intervention has recently emerged as 
a new instrument. It is becoming an established practice that media friendly to the government are rewarded 
with government advertisingand those critical of the government are not ﬁ nancially supported. What this 
means is that an eﬀ ective media reform program needs to address the transparency of the government’s 
advertising spend. Also, the Broadcasting Business Act has to be interpreted liberally to avoid self-censorship 
by broadcasters, as discussed in section 2.2.2. 
Internet regulation has become more stringent after the enactment of the Computer-Related Crime Act. 
Indiscriminate enforcement of the law has led to the closure of a large number of websites and prosecution of 
some journalists, some of which—and whom—might not have violated any laws (see section 7.1.2.2). Th e lèse 
majesté law appears to have been abused to silence political rivals. For example, Mr. Th aksin and his archrival, 
Sondhi Limthongkul, both ﬁ led charges of lèse majesté against each other. 
From our observations, there appears to be a signiﬁ cant increase in the amount of, and a change in the nature 
of, public debate related to digital media laws compared with similar laws governing analog context. Th e 
enactment of the NBTC Act conﬁ rms this. Th e law took more than a year and a half to get through parliament. 
Most of the time was spent on debate of the Act in the House’s Special Subcommittee. Th e meeting room of 
the subcommittee was usually packed and closed-circuit television had to be used to broadcast the meeting to 
interested parties and journalists, who closely followed its progress. Numerous proposals were submitted to 
the subcommittee by professional and business associations, the telecom regulator, civil society organizations, 
religious groups, community radio operators, and the labor unions of state enterprises. Outside parliament, 
countless seminars, workshops, and public hearing sessions were conducted in parallel. 
Th is level of active participation was for a number of reasons. First, the Act is related to the convergence of 
broadcasting and telecommunications services, and thus is of interest to people in both industries. Second, 
the Act brings about a signiﬁ cant reform in the two sectors, which involves high stakes. Finally, the Act raises 
new issues, such as the digitization of terrestrial television, which require considerable eﬀ ort to understand. 
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Delays in legislation and the appointment of the sector regulator turn out to be the most important 
bottlenecks for market reform. Although the NBTC Act ﬁ nally passed into law in December 2010, it is two 
years behind the deadline set by the Constitution. Th ere may be further delays in the selection of the NBTC 
and the drafting of the master plans. Accountability to the public of the independent NBTC will be another 
important issue. Meanwhile, technologies continue to evolve and the market has been left without a regulator 
and thus no eﬀ ective enforcement of the law. As a result, disputes between parties who claim overlapping 
rights, and confusion, abound. With all these problems, Th ailand is at risk of wasting the opportunities 
brought about by new media. 




Th e most signiﬁ cant positive development in terms of media independence during the past ﬁ ve years happened 
in 2008 when Th ai PBS was established. Never before has Th ailand had a media organization that is truly 
independent from political and commercial interference. While Th ai PBS has yet to achieve high popularity 
(and may never do so), it has already provided an important alternative for audiences dissatisﬁ ed with the diet 
provided by mainstream media. It has also provided a public space for civic participation in many programs, 
such as prime-time news programs that allow grass-root citizens to report news from their perspective, and 
talk programs that invite ordinary people to share their views. 
With regard to the diversity of media ownership and content, the most signiﬁ cant positive development 
during the past ﬁ ve years was the passage of the Broadcasting Business Act in 2008. Th e Act has led to the 
rapid growth of cable and satellite television and, subsequently, to an increase in the diversity of media 
ownership and content. While this growth may have surpassed actual market demand, the biggest threats to 
Th ailand are not economic but political and social. As satellite television is increasingly used as a propaganda 
machine, the country becomes more deeply divided. It is unfortunate that in almost every political issue, even 
simple facts are now disputed by the parties involved. 
Th e growth of community radio has increased the pluralism of voices. Every local community now has 
a radio channel to communicate within its area. However, the lack of regulatory enforcement has led to 
spectrum interference and to disputes between community and commercial radios. 
Finally, the growth of the internet and social media also contributes to greater media diversity. It also changes 
the role of ordinary citizens from news consumers to reporters, and allows activists to take political action in 
new ways.
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8.1.2 Negative Developments
Th e most negative development in terms of media independence was the use of the Emergency Decree to 
shut down thousands of critical community radio stations and websites during the political clashes of 2010. 
While many of these stations were admittedly partisan; some even promoted violence and incited hatred, 
while others merely oﬀ ered viewpoints that the government disliked. Even though the political tension has 
eased, media control under the Decree remains tight. Th e draconian enforcement of the Computer-related 
Crime Act also has chilling eﬀ ects on media professionals and others involved in political debate (see section 
7.1.2).
8.2 Media Tomorrow
Th e selection of NBTC commissioners (which is due to be completed by mid-2011) will be the most 
important event for the future of the Th ai media. Th e most important tasks awaiting the NBTC are the 
drafting of the frequency allocation master plan and the digital switchover plan. If the NBTC is selected from 
independent-minded people, then long-awaited sectoral reform can begin. On the contrary, if the selection 
process is blocked or distorted by vested interests, as has happened many times in the past, reform may be 
further delayed, perpetuating the status quo. 
Th e regulation of media content by self-regulatory bodies, such as the National Press Council of Th ailand 
and the News Broadcasting Council of Th ailand, will also be tested in the new media environment, where 
a diverse range of media co-exist. If self-regulation proves to be eﬀ ective, the public will have faith in the 
system and the government will have no rationale for intervention. On the other hand, if these self-regulatory 
bodies fail to live up to expectations, the public will likely call for—or, at least, tolerate—state intervention 
and censorship. Th e future of media independence will thus hinge on the adaptability and eﬀ ectiveness of 
the existing system of self-regulation.
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9. Recommendations
Th e Recommendations are currently in preparation and will be added to this report in the near future.
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